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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to study how accounting-based and market-based credit risk 
determinants compare in assessing credit risk in different economic regimes by 
examining a sample of credit default swaps (CDS) on U.S. non-financial firms in 2007–
2012. Furthermore, the regime dependency of credit risk determinants is examined 
during the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and post-crisis. Most importantly, this thesis 
focuses uniquely on examining the asymmetric, nonlinear effects of credit risk 
determinants in different levels of credit default swap spread.  
 
In the empirical part, a sample of 207 credit default swap spreads on U.S. non-financial 
firms is examined together with eight accounting-based variables and six market-based 
variables, respectively. The data consists of quarterly observations in 2007–2012, 
covering both the financial crisis period and the post-crisis recovery period. A linear 
regression is employed to study the relative performance of accounting-based and 
market-based models. Moreover, a quantile regression method is conducted to provide 
evidence on asymmetric effects together with symmetric quantiles test.  
 
A majority of the increasing literature on the relationship between credit risk models 
and credit default swaps find that accounting and market data should be considered as 
complements rather than substitutes to one another.  Similar to previous studies, the 
results imply that both accounting- and market-based variables contribute to the firm’s 
CDS spread. Moreover, the effects of the most essential accounting-based variables, 
leverage and return on asset, intensify during the financial crisis period, whereas the 
most influential market-based variables, volatility and equity return, experience the 
opposite effect.  
 
Finally, the results suggest that there is an increasing survival effect, which occurs as 
accelerating nonlinear effects of risk determinants within the higher CDS spread firms. 
The asymmetric effects are also dependent on the prevailing economic conditions, 
suggesting higher firm-specific asymmetric effects during the recovery period than the 
financial crisis. 
  
KEYWORDS: Credit default swap, credit risk, financial crisis, financial distress 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Credit default swaps (CDS) are one of the most recent innovations in finance and since 
their invention in 1994, the markets for credit default swaps have exploded. Essentially, 
credit default swaps are insurance contracts for hedging against an undesirable credit 
event, that is, the default on the underlying debt. Although, like any other credit 
derivative, they can be used also for speculation purposes. Recent debate about credit 
default swaps focuses on their role in the financial crisis of 2007–2009 or in the 
ongoing Greek debt crisis. Also, the regulation of credit default swap markets has been 
a very much discussed topic in the aftermath of the financial crisis (e.g. Stulz 2010, 
Jarrow 2011). According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the total 
notional amount of the CDS market at the end of 2012 reached over $25 trillion, which 
is under half of the peak of $62 trillion in the end of 2007. In 2012, non-financial firms 
accounted for almost $10 trillion of the overall market size (Bank for International 
Settlements 2013). 
 
The aim of this thesis is to find relevant accounting-based variables to explain firms’ 
credit risk, and additionally, to examine whether market-based variables contribute to 
the credit risk assessment, as previous studies suggest (e.g. Benkert 2004; Das, Hanouna 
& Sarin 2009; Ericsson, Jacobs & Oviedo 2009). Different historically relevant 
measures of financial distress are utilized in the approach of the anatomy of credit risk. 
Credit default swaps offer a unique platform for measuring the continuous appearance 
of fundamental credit risk.  
 
Finally, the most unique and important goal of the thesis is to study the asymmetric 
credit risk dynamics and nonlinear effects in different economic regimes. In respect to 
previous literature on credit default swaps, the approach employed in the thesis provides 
an exclusive outlook on dynamics of credit risk assessment. 
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
There are various ways to measure firm’s default risk. The most common approaches 
are accounting-based and market-based models, of which both include multiple models 
developed over the years. The modeling of default using accounting numbers has an 
extended history, such as Altman’s Z-score (1968) and Ohlson’s O-score (1980), 
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whereas the market-based structural models are newer and more complex.  The basis of 
structural models was developed after the Black-Scholes option pricing model was 
introduced in 1973, when Merton (1974) used implied volatility from option pricing 
model to calculate a probability of default. After Merton’s model, a number of more 
sophisticated and developed structural models for predicting financial distress have 
been introduced, and many of them are currently in commercial use of, for example, 
credit rating agencies and banks. Market-based default prediction models have gained 
acceptance by both academics and practitioners, probably because of the theoretical 
framework behind the models. Accounting-based models are essentially inductive and 
based on empirical findings, which can make them unattractive in some circumstances. 
Regardless, both approaches have yielded a number of remarkable results in prediction 
of financial distress over the time. At the same time, both approaches have also been 
criticized and some essential flaws have been pointed out.  
 
Since credit default swaps are essentially for hedging the default on underlying debt, 
they include valuable information of the financial condition of the underlying company 
and the probability of default. Therefore, the price of CDS should be directly in relation 
to the probability of going into financial distress. Also, measuring the relationship 
between the CDS spread over the risk-free rate and the default model can be used as an 
alternative to using samples of actual bankruptcies. Integrating the default models to 
actual bankruptcy cases is somewhat difficult, since many of these models require for 
publicly traded companies. This restriction limits the data available, since there are not 
many bankruptcies of public companies within recent years, although the occurred ones 
have been impressively sized. Credit default swaps provide an easy access to measure 
the default risk with fresh data along with sufficient number of observations. 
Furthermore, the binary nature of bankruptcy restricts the examination of the escalation 
of credit risk, whereas the credit default swaps are continuously adjusted for the 
probability of default. Using CDS spreads instead of bankruptcy cases as a proxy allows 
for deeper examination of the nature of credit risk. 
 
 
1.2. Purpose of the thesis 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the effects of both accounting- and market-based 
credit risk determinants on credit default swap spreads of non-financial firms in 
different economic regimes. The objective is to find accounting-based variables and 
ratios that are the most influential to explain firm’s credit risk, and furthermore, to 
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examine the effects of equity market information to the credit risk assessment. Such 
variables are determined from extended literature regarding credit risk and financial 
distress. Credit default swaps on the underlying debt are used as a proxy for firms’ 
credit risk, which allows for continuous analysis of the nature of the risk. 
 
There are many complications when dealing with accounting information, such as 
valuation and reliability of numbers, but initially they form the base for fundamental 
analysis and market information. Moreover, credit risk can be approached through 
equity market information, on which the market models are naturally based on. The 
further objective of the thesis is to find if including market information to accounting-
based models improve the model. The aim is to combine the important common 
variables from both the accounting-based models and market models to relevant 
combination.  
 
Moreover, the dynamics of credit risk determinants are examined during the financial 
crisis of 2007–2009. This approach allows comparing the development of credit risk 
proxies during the periods of economic recovery as well as high uncertainty. The aim is 
to study, whether the meaningful credit risk determinants change in respect to 
corresponding market conditions and if so, how the crisis period is incorporated in these 
determinants.  
 
Finally, the most unique contribution of the thesis is to examine credit risk asymmetries 
and deviation of credit risk proxies between high and low CDS spread firms. In contrast 
to previous studies, where the unbalanced credit risk is studied by controlling for the 
credit ratings (thus, allegedly for credit risk), the purpose of this thesis is to compare the 
dynamics of credit risk variables in the tails of CDS spread. This thesis contributes 
uniquely to the relationship between the asymmetric distribution of credit risk and credit 
risk determinants, and moreover, presents exclusive remarks on the credit risk 
asymmetry, dynamic market conditions and various credit risk factors.  
 
 
1.3. Hypotheses and structure 
 
Next, the research hypotheses are formed in order to approach the research subject 
empirically. But first, research problems are specified and stated. Questions behind the 
hypotheses are:  
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• Do accounting ratios have contribution in explaining firm’s credit risk?  
• Which ratios are the most important ones?  
• Does market information improve the credit risk model? 
• Are high and low risk firms affected asymmetrically by credit risk determinants? 
• Are the CDS spread determinants affected by different economic regimes? 
 
The price of a CDS contract on a healthy firm with good accounting ratios should 
reflect those thriving numbers. On the other hand, hedging should be more expensive on 
the debt of an unhealthy firm with a notable risk of default. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is formed:  
 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: Accounting-based ratios do not explain CDS spreads. 
H1: Accounting-based ratios explain CDS spread. 
 
To test the first hypothesis, a group of empirically relevant accounting ratios are 
regressed to explain the CDS premium. The results should reflect the relevance of the 
different ratios in explaining credit risk. The selected accounting ratios are tested 
together in order to find their relevance in explaining CDS spread. The main points of 
interest regarding the first hypothesis are, whether the variables hold their expected 
signs and whether they are significant in explaining CDS spread. The variables included 
in the first model are presented in Table 1 together with their expected signs. The 
variables are chosen in regard to past empirical relevance, as discussed later in the 
thesis. 
 
 
Table 1. Predicted signs for accounting-based variables. 
ACCOUNTING-BASED VARIABLES ABBREVIATION SIGN 
Return on assets ROA − 
Retained earnings / Total assets RE/TA − 
Interest coverage COV − 
Current ratio CR − 
Total debt / Total assets TL/TA + 
Total debt / Common equity TL/CE + 
Total assets TA − 
Working capital / Total assets WC/TA − 
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In addition to first hypothesis, market-based variables are introduced to the model. The 
market-based variables are chosen based on theoretical framework on firm default 
presented later in the thesis. Also, stock market performance ratios, earnings per share 
and dividends per share, are included in the analysis to explore their possible 
informative power in credit risk assessment. Hence, the second hypothesis is formed: 
 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: Accounting-based model cannot be improved with equity market information. 
H1: Accounting-based model improves with equity market information.  
 
The second hypothesis introduces equity market information to the first model and, 
essentially, tests whether the explanatory power of the model increases. Moreover, 
possible changes in the significance and effectiveness of the initial variables are 
examined. Predicted signs regarding the market-based variables are presented in Table 
2. Based on Merton’s (1974) theoretical framework on firm default and structural 
components, equity return and volatility, market leverage and risk-free rate are selected 
in the analysis. Additionally, earnings per share and dividends per share ratios are 
selected to examine the effects of stock market performance ratios on CDS spreads.  
 
 
Table 2. Predicted signs for equity market variables. 
MARKET-BASED VARIABLES ABBREVIATION SIGN 
Stock return RET − 
Annualized volatility VOL + 
Leverage LEV + 
Earnings per share EPS − 
Dividends per share DPS − 
Risk.free rate RF − 
 
 
The third hypothesis tests the impact of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 on the credit 
risk. At the time, the CDS spreads widened dramatically in all rating classes as a result 
of economic uncertainty. Especially the CDS spreads of financial institutions climbed to 
new heights, as they were in the center of the economic crisis. The market conditions 
have had empirically less impact on the credit spread than the firm characteristics. The 
third hypothesis tests whether the macroeconomic conditions reflect to accounting-
based measures, and hence have an impact on the CDS spread of non-financial firms. 
The main interest is whether the estimates are associated with high economic 
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uncertainty, and thus change signs or gain (lose) significance. The relationship between 
accounting-based credit risk and CDS spread in different economic conditions can be 
summarized as following: 
 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: Relationship between credit risk determinants and CDS spreads is not dependent on 
economic regime. 
H1: Relationship between credit risk determinants and CDS spreads is dependent on 
economic regime. 
 
In addition, possible asymmetric effects between high and low risk firms are examined 
by quantile regression approach. Such estimation approach allows deeper examination 
of credit risk dynamics and sensitivity to risk determinants compared to linear 
estimation. According to previous literature, the firms’ exposures to different credit risk 
variables vary between rating classes, as shown later in the paper. Hence, controlling for 
different levels of CDS spreads, i.e., credit risk instead of credit ratings, asymmetric 
responses to credit risk determinants can be observed and examined in a deeper manner. 
The purpose is to examine, whether the aforementioned credit risk determinants have 
accelerating survival effects in the high-risk tail. The main attention lies in the 
convexity or concavity of the variables: Asymmetric, accelerating effects between the 
high and low credit risk levels would infer increasing survival effects for firms that are 
closer to default. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is formed as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: Credit risk determinants do not have asymmetric effects on CDS spreads in higher 
credit risk levels. 
H1: Credit risk determinants have asymmetric effects on CDS spreads in higher credit 
risk levels.  
 
In the remainder of the thesis, the theoretical framework behind the hypotheses is 
introduced. First, features of credit risk are introduced together with different 
approaches and measures of credit risk, such as ratings and credit models. Second, 
credit default swaps, CDS markets and the function of CDS contracts are introduced. In 
the CDS part, the main subject is hedging and the speculation possibilities are not 
considered widely. After that, accounting-based models credit risk models are presented 
more closely and their components and the further applications, such as Altman’s 
(1968) Z-score, are examined. In the final part of literature preview, the growing field of 
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studies about the relationship between credit models and credit default swaps are 
introduced. In this part, different approaches are compared and, based on the empirical 
findings, the most significant and relevant variables contributing to the relationship are 
utilized in the empirical part of this thesis. 
 
After the literature preview, the data and the methodologies are presented in section 
five. Next, the summary statistics and empirical findings are provided and the 
hypotheses are tested in section six. Finally, in section seven, conclusions are drawn 
together with the most considerable observations and results. 
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2. CREDIT RISK 
 
 
In this chapter, the most important previous studies regarding credit risk, different credit 
risk models and the relationship between these models and CDS prices are introduced. 
The goal is to provide the bottom lines from previous literature and associate them to 
the hypotheses formed earlier. The very basics of firm default risk, and thus the base of 
credit default swaps, is approached from different angles and a holistic picture of 
default risk is considered.  
 
 
2.1. Credit risk 
 
Credit risk means a possibility of a negative outcome that the issuer of debt or bond is 
unable to meet its obligations. For lender, credit risk is the most significant risk when 
dealing with corporate debt or bonds and therefore the anatomy of the risk is very well 
studied. There is a wide range of tools to estimate the counterparty credit risk and the 
possibility of failure, such as credit ratings by different rating agencies, accounting-
based credit scoring systems and structural approach. In this chapter, different 
approaches and the most common tools to measure the credit risk are introduced.  
 
Credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings, provide 
information on the debtor’s abilities to meet its financial obligations and on the 
possibility of default. Credit rating agencies evaluate the quality of the credit of the 
underlying firm and summarize it to a single measure, a credit rating. In this thesis, the 
quoted credit ratings are from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating scale, which runs 
from AAA (the most creditworthy) to D (default on financial commitments). Note that 
credit ratings are relative opinions about the credit quality and creditworthiness, not 
absolute measures of default probability (Standard & Poor’s 2012). 
 
Table 3 shows the transitions between different scales of credit rating agencies. Ratings 
above BBB are called investment grade and, inversely, ratings below the BBB threshold 
are called non-investment grade or speculative grade. Often, bonds with rating below 
BBB are called junk bonds. As mentioned, all the ratings quoted in this thesis are from 
the S&P scale or converted into corresponding S&P form to make them comparable.  
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Table 3. Credit rating scales for different credit rating agencies. 
 
 
The default component in corporate bond prices should be equal to corresponding CDS 
premium as CDS prices should reflect the creditworthiness of the underlying firm. This 
default component is measured by dividing the corporate yield spread with CDS 
premium, which is the measure of risk-neutral default component. In 2001–2002, total 
yield spread explained by default component using Treasury rate as a risk-free proxy 
was 51 % for AAA/AA-rated bonds, 56 % for A-rated bonds and 71 % for BBB-rated 
bonds. For speculative, in this case BB-rated, bonds the default component accounted 
for 83 % of yield spread. These results indicate that default component explains the 
majority of corporate yield spreads accounting more than 50 % in every investment 
grade rating class and over 80 % in speculative rating (BB) class. (Longstaff, Mithal & 
Neis 2005.) 
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Credit risk can be observed by examining the yield spread between corporate bonds and 
Treasury bonds of comparable maturities. Huang and Huang (2002) find that for 
investment-grade bonds (credit rating equal or higher than BBB), credit risk accounts 
for less than 20 % of the credit spread between corporate bond and Treasury bond of 
corresponding maturity, except for BBB-rated bonds with maturity of 10 years 
(29,1 %). For the speculative grade bonds, credit risk accounts for a much larger 
proportion of the credit spread: For BB-rated bonds with maturities of 4 and 10 years, 
the credit risk accounts for 53,9 % and 60,1 % of spread, whereas for B-rated bonds 
with corresponding maturities, credit risk accounts for 94,8 % and 82,5 %, respectively. 
Interestingly, the fraction of the credit risk decreases heavily for the B-rated bonds 
when moving from medium-term to longer-term maturity, while investment grade 
bonds capture the opposite effect with equivalent maturities. For example, the fractions 
of spread due to default for AAA-rated bonds with maturities of 4 years and 10 years 
are 2,1 % and 15,8 %, respectively. This is explained by mean reversion of credit 
quality over the time, which expects higher credit risk for investment rate bonds as the 
maturity increases.  
 
Mean reversion and its effects on bond yield spreads for different rating classes are 
presented in Figure 1. As discussed earlier, empirical results suggest that the yield 
spreads tend to converge with time to maturity: on one hand, yield spread for higher 
grade bonds have a tendency to increase with the maturity, whereas on the other hand, 
the yield spreads of lower rated bonds tend to be narrower at the long end, as visualized 
in Figure 1. (Crouhy, Galai & Mark 2000.) 
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Figure 1. Spread curves for different credit qualities. (Crouhy et al. 2000.) 
 
 
Both Longstaff et al. (2005) and Huang and Huang (2002) conclude that the remaining 
fraction of the credit spread not explained by credit risk is mostly caused by liquidity 
and tax treatment regarding corporate bonds. In addition, when liquidity of corporate 
bonds decreases, the fraction of nondefault component increases, that is, bonds with 
higher illiquidity usually have a larger liquidity component included in their yield 
spreads.  
 
Huang and Huang (2002) argue that speculative grade bonds may be even more liquid 
than investment grade bonds because of higher trading volumes. The level of illiquidity 
does not fluctuate as severely as the level of credit risk around the investment grade 
threshold. Longstaff et al. (2005) find that for AAA/AA-rated bonds, the nondefault 
component is about -13 basis points lower than average, which suggests that there is a 
small flight-to-quality premium in the prices of the highest-rated bonds.  
 
Credit risk is likely to be positively correlated with levels of liquidity spreads, that is, 
the higher the credit risk, the higher the liquidity spread of the bond. The liquidity 
spreads should have a negative relationship with time to maturity, whereas the credit 
risk is an increasing function of time to maturity. In addition, yield spreads are driven 
positively by stock market volatility, which increases the likelihood of default, except 
for AAA-rated bonds, whose yield spreads are more likely to be affected by liquidity 
than credit risk. The volatility effect is stronger when moving from higher rating bonds 
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to junk bonds, which confirms the relationship between credit risk and yield spread. 
(Ericsson & Renault 2006.) 
 
In contrary to results presented above, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) argue 
that most of the corporate yield spread over the government bonds is not explained by 
expected default loss, but tax premium and systematic risk premium. In fact, their 
evidence suggests that no more than 25 % of the corporate spot yield spreads is 
explained by default risk. The corporate spot rates are derived based on a risk neutrality 
assumption, so that the modeled spot rates incorporate only the risk due to expected 
default losses. Corporate spot yield curve shows that the bonds are priced as if the 
ratings captured the real information regarding default risk, and that there is a positive 
relationship between the corporate spot yield spreads and the maturity of the spot. 
Hence, default risk leads to higher spot rates for corporate bonds. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the relationship of credit risk to the maturity of the bond is 
nonlinear over time because of the mean reversion. This arises because bonds drift 
between rating classes over time and, thus, the probability of default increases for the 
high-rated bonds and, contrariwise, decreases for the lower-rated bonds. Within one 
year period, an AAA-rated bond has zero probability of defaulting, whereas the 
probability for CCC-rated bond equals to 22,05 %. Moreover, if the CCC-rated bond 
survives 19 years without defaulting, the probability of default deteriorates to 2,93 %, 
while the probability for the AAA-rated bond increases to 0,33 %. This credit rating 
transition does not hold equally for all rating classes and, for example, CCC-rated bonds 
have lower conditional probability of default than B-rated bonds after 12 years of 
existence due to this credit migration. (Elton et al. 2001.) 
 
Assessing credit risk solely through credit ratings is potentially hazardous and 
fallacious, since the industry confronts an impending conflict of interest in their 
operations. Rating the products of the firms that form the primary source of income and 
at the same time dealing with a vast group of investors in the financial markets and 
producing widely followed information, or more accurately opinions, about credit risk 
makes credit rating business a looming source of conflicts. Moreover, the fallacious 
nature of credit rating industry is supported by inefficient duopoly between S&P and 
Moody’s, which causes the issuer to have more possibilities to shop for desired rating or 
for the best rating available. Including Fitch and so on extending the duopoly to three 
big rating agencies makes no difference, while in fact, it increases the effect. This 
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phenomenon is rather deeply rooted, since the credit rating industry has very high, 
absolute barrier to entry. (Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012.) 
 
Furthermore, the quality of the ratings depends on the market conditions, the market 
participants and the reputation of the rating agency, that is, the timeliness and accuracy 
of assessments of credit risk. In good, booming market conditions, when the number of 
trusting investors that take ratings at face value, such as pension fund managers or other 
institutional investors, the credit rating agencies’ ratings seem to inflate, causing an 
upward bias in ratings. (Bolton et al. 2012.) 
 
Moreover, He, Qian and Strahan (2011) find that both the size of the issuer and the 
market conditions are related to the rating of its products. The inflated ratings received 
by large issuers causes the issued products to underperform compared to small issuers. 
The fraction of the underperformance of the highest rated mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) is related to the size of the issuer and the effect is particularly strong during the 
market boom, supporting the findings of Bolton et al. (2012). These findings indicate 
that the credit rating agency is more prone to rate the issuer of the underlying rather 
than the actual product, especially when dealing with more complex financial products. 
Together with the fact that credit rating agencies can make adjustments to their model 
outputs before final rating, these findings are robust evidence of the introverted and 
conflicting nature of rating industry and, furthermore, the use of credit ratings as 
(absolute) proxy for credit risk is somewhat delusive. 
 
All in all, the ratings by credit rating agencies are widely used and applied, even 
required in some instances in practice but, as shown, they involve a lot of fallacious 
information and biasedness. The usefulness and feasibility of ratings as a credit risk 
proxy is summarized by anonymous analyst at on of the major credit rating agencies as 
follows (Securities and Exchange Commission 2008): 
 
“The deal ... could be structured by cows and we would rate it.” 
 
In the following section, more fundamental and transparent credit risk models are 
presented. Credit risk is assessed first by inductive accounting-based models, which are 
based heavily on empirical findings of default determinants. Additionally, market-based 
structural models are covered to provide a theoretically more attractive, deductive 
approach to credit risk.  
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2.2. Credit risk models 
 
As mentioned, there are several ways to estimate credit risk. First, probability of default 
can be estimated from accounting variables and financial ratios. Accounting-based 
credit-score systems, such as the linear probability model, the logit model, the probit 
model and the discriminant analysis model, use a combination of accounting variables 
to calculate a single measure for probability of default. Second, increasingly popular 
and useful credit risk models are “risk of ruin” models that utilize option pricing model 
in the estimation of the probability of distress. Option pricing based credit risk models 
calculate the probability of the market value of firm’s assets to fall below its (short 
term) outside debt based on the implicit volatilities from Black-Scholes-Merton model. 
The models provide “distance-to-default” value, which measures how many standard 
deviations the equity values are above short-term debt. The probability of going into 
distress is based on the distance of how far the firm is from the default situation, and 
what percentage of firms actually defaulted from that distance. These structural models 
are originally based on Merton’s (1974) asset value model, and there are several 
applications developed on the basis of this model, such as Moody’s KMV. Third, the 
term-structure of corporate yield spread can be used to calculate the implied 
probabilities of default. Implied forward rates are derived from the yield curve to 
measure the risk premium of default over the risk-free bond. Finally, probabilities of 
default can be derived from past data on bond defaults by credit rating grade and 
maturity. These models are based on the mortality rates of bonds with certain attributes 
and utilize historical data together with credit ratings by rating agencies. (Altman & 
Saunders 1998.) 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, the development of credit risk measuring and different 
prediction models, that are meaningful for the remainder of this thesis, are introduced. 
First, credit risk assessment is covered with accounting-based models and important 
financial statement ratios to measure credit risk are provided and examined. 
Furthermore, theoretical framework behind the structural risk of ruin models is 
presented. Also the defects regarding both approaches are discussed shortly. 
 
2.2.1. Accounting-based models 
 
Credit risk models and bankruptcy prediction based on accounting ratios have a rich 
empirical history starting from Beaver (1966) and followed by Altman (1968) and 
Ohlson (1980). Over time, as more complex and theoretically more accepted models 
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have been introduced, these accounting-based credit risk models have drawn more 
debate about their acceptability and qualities to predict possible financial failures. 
Accounting-based models are essentially built by searching through a large number of 
financial ratios with the ratio loadings estimated on a sample of failed and non-failed 
firms.  One reason for the criticism is their bottom-up nature as they rise strongly from 
empirical findings, whereas the structural models are built deductively top-down, 
starting from the theory. However, regardless their inductive nature, the accounting-
based credit risk models prove themselves as useful tools to measure the fundamental 
risk of failure and more effortlessly provide essential information about the financial 
health of a company.  
 
The most known accounting-based default model is the Altman’s (1968) Z-score, which 
is a discriminant analysis method that is based on five most influential empirically 
found financial ratios. The original model concentrated on finding the significant 
differences between the common features of the distressed firms and the common 
features of healthy firms. In Equation 1, the original combination resulting from the 
analysis is presented: 
 
 
(1)  Z = 1,2X1 + 1,4X2 + 3,3X3 + 0,6X4 + 0,999X5 
 
 
where X1 =  Working Capital / Total Assets (WC/TA) 
 X2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets (RE/TA) 
 X3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets (EBIT/TA) 
 X4 = Market Value of Equity / Book Value of Total Liabilities (MVE/TL) 
 X5 = Sales/ Total Assets (S/TA) 
 
Firms with Z-score above 2,99 are in the safe zone and concluded as “non-bankrupt”, 
while firms with Z-score less than 1,81 are all bankrupt. The zone between 1,81–2,99 is 
denoted as the “gray area” because of the error classifications of the model. (Altman 
1968.) 
 
The original Z-score is primarily designed to test the financial distress among 
manufacturing firms. For non-financial firms and emerging markets, the initial model 
was revised to new Z’’-score. Equation 2 shows the new model for non-financial firms: 
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(2)  Z’’ = 6.56X1+ 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 
 
 
where the variables are the same as in the original Z-score presented in Equation 1. 
Only Sales/Total Assets measure is left out to minimize the potential industry effect. 
The classification zones for Z’’-score are exactly the same as in the original model. 
(Altman, Hartzell & Peck 1995.) 
 
Furthermore, a seven variable model called ZETA model is developed from the basis of 
the original model. The ZETA model is a commercial model that includes the most 
reliable variables; it accounts for return on assets (ROA), stability of earnings, debt 
service (interest coverage ratio), cumulative profitability (retained earnings to total 
assets), liquidity (current ratio), capitalization (common equity to total capital) and size 
(total assets). The model itself is not available because of its commercial nature. 
Compared to the original Z-score, the ZETA model succeeds to identify distressed firms 
more accurately two to five years prior to bankruptcy event. The Z-score has a 
classification accuracy of 93,9 % one year prior to bankruptcy, while ZETA model 
estimates 96,2 % correctly. In the case of non-bankrupt firms, the respective accuracy is 
97,0 % (89,7 %) for Z-score (ZETA score). (Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan 1977.) 
 
Ohlson (1980) points out several problems associated with models using multivariate 
discriminant analysis, such as Z-score, which can be avoided with the use of conditional 
logit analysis method. Unlike multivariate discriminant analysis models, which result a 
score with very little intuitive interpretation, the conditional logit analysis estimates 
directly the probability of failure within a prespecified period of time. Moreover, no 
assumptions regarding the prior probabilities or the distributions of the predicting 
variables are necessary, which is a significant advantage.  
 
In the empirical part of forming the probabilistic model of bankruptcy, a set of nine 
different independent variables is tested to construct a valid model to estimate the 
probability of failure. The main criterion for deciding among different variables is 
simplicity of the predictors and, ultimately, the model included such variables as 
logarithm of total assets (SIZE), total liabilities to total assets (TLTA), working capital 
to total assets (WCTA), current liabilities to current assets (CLCA), net income to total 
assets (NITA), funds provided by the operations to total liabilities (FUTL), change in 
net income (CHIN), and two dummy variables regarding negative net income (INTWO) 
and negative equity (OENEG). The coefficients of the financial statement variables, that 
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is, variables 1–4, and the coefficients of the performance variables (variables 5–9) are 
uncorrelated, and thus both sets of predicting variables seem to have some independent 
predicting power. The logit model based on these variables shows serious predictive 
power with 96,12 % of correctly predicted bankruptcies one year before failure. This 
suggests that accounting measures include information about company’s health and that 
they can be used to estimate the credit risk of the underlying company. Lastly, the 
differences in results provided by different models based on financial ratios can be 
mostly explained by the selection of predictors and the lack of nonaccounting-based 
data, such as market-based data, and the choice of estimation procedures. (Ohlson 
1980.) 
 
A comparative analysis between different estimation procedures and predictors included 
in these models shows that the choice of methodology affects the variable specification. 
The use of discriminant analysis, logit analysis and neural networks all lead to different 
model specifications and also the number of variables included in the models varies. 
From the 31 most empirically influential financial ratios divided into three typical 
dimensions, liquidity, profitability and solidity, the discriminant analysis selects two 
liquidity measures (cash flow to total debt and quick assets to total assets), one 
profitability measure (net sales to total assets) and one solidity measure (total 
debt/equity) one year before failure. Moreover, the logit model leaves out the 
profitability dimension one year prior to failure, including the same liquidity measures 
as discriminant analysis model together with total debt to total assets ratio as a measure 
of solidity. However, based on variables two years prior to failure, both models 
incorporate completely different predictors as well as larger number of predicting 
variables. In addition, liquidity seems to be generally the most attributable aspect to the 
firm’s default risk. Overall, a comparative analysis shows that the logit analysis uses a 
fewer number of variables than discriminant analysis to combine information regarding 
financial failure and still manages to outperform it on year prior to failure. This 
evidence clearly supports Ohlson’s conclusion about the possible effects the choice of 
the estimation procedure. (Back, Laitinen, Sere & van Wezel 1995.) 
 
2.2.2. Market-based models 
 
The first credit risk model based on equity market information was introduced by 
Merton (1974), soon after Black-Scholes option pricing formula had been presented. 
The main idea behind Merton’s model is that the value of corporate debt is 
fundamentally depended on the risk-free rate, the bond indenture, such as maturity and 
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coupon rate, and the probability of failure. This allows using the same basic approach of 
Black-Scholes formula with observable equity market variables. Thus, the resulting 
model is theoretically attractive, although it has a number of assumptions included. 
However, this Merton-type pricing model is widely used and accepted, and there are a 
number of redeveloped applications based on the grand idea, such as commercial 
Moody’s KMV model. 
 
In the theoretical framework of structural models, a firm is supposed to have different 
classes of claims, a single class debt and equity as a residual claim. Furthermore, the 
firm has promised the bondholders to make a specified payment on a specified date. 
Hence, in the event that the firm does not meet its obligations, that is, the payment is not 
met, the debtholders immediately take over the company and the shareholders receive 
the residual claim, in this case nothing. Given these assumptions, the value of the equity 
can be written as a European call option on firm’s assets, where today’s firm asset value 
corresponds to stock price and the face value of debt corresponds to the exercise price. 
The value of the debt is an increasing function of asset value and promised payment to 
bondholders, and decreasing function of time to maturity, asset volatility, and risk-free 
rate. (Merton 1974.) 
 
This reasoning allows that the risky debt of the firm can be viewed as a risk-free debt 
plus a short put option on the firm’s assets. In this form, the strike price equals to the 
same face value of the debt as mentioned before and the risk-free debt is the face value 
of debt discounted at the risk-free rate.  
 
As a direct consequence of Merton’s (1974) framework, the probability of default can 
be expressed as a distance-to-default measure, which is specified as the distance of 
firm’s future asset value from the default threshold (level of debt) in normal cumulative 
density function. Hence, the model provides a measure of distance (standard deviation) 
of how far the firm is from the default, which is a direct result of the assumptions 
behind the model. The following equations are based on the theoretical framework of 
Merton’s (1974) credit risk model and the presentations below follow the presentations 
of Crouhy et al. (2000) and Giesecke (2002) regarding the underlying model.  
 
The value of firm’s assets at time t, Vt, is assumed to follow a standard geometric 
Brownian motion, that is: 
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(3) Vt  =  V0  exp  [(µμ  -­‐  σ2/2)t  +  σ tZt]   with 𝑍!    ~  N(0,1) 
 
 
where Vt = Firm’s assets value 
 µ = Mean of the instantaneous rate of return on the assets (drift) 
 σ2 = Variance of the instantaneous rate of return on the assets (volatility) 
 
Furthermore, Vt is log-normally distributed with expected value at time t: 
 
 
(4) E(Vt) = V0 eµt 
 
 
As mentioned, the default occurs when the value of assets is less than the promised 
payment to the debtholders, given that the balance sheet of the firm is simplified as in 
Merton’s (1974) framework. This structural relationship between firm’s risky assets Vt, 
level of debt F and maturity T is illustrated in Figure 2, where the shaded area below F 
denotes the probability of default. Hence, for the probability of default, it can be written 
as follows: 
 
 
(5) 𝑝!"#   = Pr 𝑉!   ≤   𝑉!"#  
 
 
 
 =  Pr ln VDefV0   –   µμ  –   σ22 t  σ t   ≥  Zt  
 
 
 
 
 = Pr Zt     ≤ − ln V0VDef   +   µμ  –   σ22 t  σ t   ≡   N(−𝑑!) 
 
 
 
where VDef is the critical asset value and Zt is the threshold in the standard normal 
distribution corresponding to default probability pDef. Hence, the equation can be 
transformed into raw distance-to-default measure: 
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(6) 𝑑! =    ln V0VDef   +   µμ  –   σ22 t  σ t  
 
 
As can be noted from Equation 6, the distance-to-default depends on the critical asset 
value, expected return on assets and asset volatility, and time to repayment. Thus, by 
using risk-free rate instead of expected return on assets, risk-free default probabilities 
can be derived from Equations 5 and 6.  
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of the assets of the firm at maturity of the debt obligation. 
(Crouhy et al. 2000.) 
 
 
However, the naïve assumptions of Merton’s (1974) model cause the model to work 
only on theoretical level rather than be extremely accurate in practice. Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) find that a simplified predictor utilizing only the form of the Merton’s 
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model performs better than the actual Merton’s model itself. The results suggest that the 
functional form of the Merton’s model is more important than the actual solution 
employed. The results have real practical contribution, because Merton’s model and its 
further commercial applications are considered feasible practices in risk management 
purposes for banks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1999). 
 
A comparative analysis between default forecasting models that are structurally the 
same but use different data inputs shows that the model with simple approximations of 
the same information captured by the original model outperforms the accurately 
estimated model. In the simplified model, the market value of the debt is approximated 
to the face value of the debt, the volatility of debt is approximated to one quarter of the 
firm’s equity volatility plus five percentage points, and the expected return on assets 
equals to the firm’s stock return over the previous year. Both the true Merton’s model 
and the simplified model perform rather well when compared to Moody’s KMV, 
correlations being 79 % for both models, respectively. However, when comparing the 
estimates of the firm volatility, the simplified model volatility has remarkably high 
correlation of 87 % with Moody’s volatility estimate, whereas the volatility computed 
from Merton’s model has only 57 % correlation. (Bharath & Shumway 2008.) 
 
When combining the two default forecasting models with the information included in 
the models, Merton’s model seems to lose its predictive power. Moreover, the 
simplified model remains as a significant contributor to default risk estimation when 
dealing with actual bankruptcy cases, even when the components are included 
separately to the hazard model. This suggests that the functional form of the model 
overrules the estimation output for default forecasting. Again, the same conclusion is 
made when estimating CDS spreads with implied probability of default: the simplified 
model keeps dominating and incorporates more explanatory power than the original 
Merton’s model. The same conclusion is made using bond spreads to predict 
bankruptcy: the simplified model outperforms the Merton’s model and remains highly 
significant even when combined with the separate components of the model. This truly 
confirms the structural and functional usefulness of the model rather than the 
applicability of the resulting default probability. (Bharath & Shumway 2008.) 
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3. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
 
 
Credit default swaps are derivative products with debt as an underlying asset. As the 
name suggests, their purpose is to trade the possible default on credit to a more certain 
and secured outcome, and limit the borrower’s exposure to credit risk. By nature they 
are insurance products to hedge from the default on underlying debt and, thus, the deal 
involves long credit risk for one side and short credit risk for the other. Credit default 
swaps can be used for number of reasons, such as reducing credit exposure, managing 
portfolio cash flow, obtaining capital relief and arbitrage. Typically, the protection 
buyer has a long position on the underlying debt and needs to reduce the credit exposure 
by purchasing credit protection, hence obtaining a short position on the debt, which 
works exactly as the opposite of long position on the debt. Therefore, credit default 
swap markets offer a natural and more easily accessible stage to trade credit risk for 
desired periods of time or desired (or sometimes required) amounts of capital than, for 
example, shorting bonds.  
 
However, credit default swaps, like any other derivative, can be also used in 
speculation. This is particularly dangerous when speaking of credit default swaps, 
because unlike insurances, they do not require for reserves, which makes the situation 
problematic in the case of default. For example, a car insurance can be bought by 
anyone who owns a car, but a credit default swap can be bought by simply anyone 
without owning the underlying. In that same fashion, one could buy car insurance for 
every car there exists and benefit from any triggering event, such as car wreck, without 
even owning a car. From insurance seller’s point of view, this could lead into numerous 
payment events and, thus, unexpectedly large obligations, should the triggering 
occasions actualize. 
 
In respect to their primary purposes, credit default swaps are considered as tools for 
hedging purposes and the speculation aspect is left mainly unnoticed in this thesis. The 
remainder of this chapter is constructed as follows: First, the basic functions and 
mechanisms of credit default swaps are introduced along with the typical features of a 
CDS contract. Second, CDS markets and the evolution of credit default swaps are 
briefly introduced. Finally, the composition of credit default swaps is examined together 
with CDS pricing and theoretical relationship between corporate bond yield spread and 
CDS spread. Also, arbitrage opportunities with credit default swaps are briefly 
discussed at the very end of this chapter. 
 31 
3.1. Mechanism of credit default swaps 
 
Credit default swaps are contracts between two parties and, essentially, they are simply 
an insurance policy, in which the policy actualizes when the issuer of the underlying 
debt defaults on its obligations. The terms and definitions considering the triggering 
event, usually referred to as credit event, are determined in the agreement between the 
buyer and the seller of the protection. Should a credit event occur, the seller of the 
protection is obliged to compensate the buyer with a predetermined settlement. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cash flows involved in a regular CDS contract. (International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association 2013.) 
 
 
The transactions between CDS contract parties are illustrated in Figure 3 by 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (later ISDA). The buyer of the 
protection pays a periodic fee, usually on a quarterly basis, to the protection seller 
during the term of the CDS. Should the reference entity default or meet the specified 
terms of credit events, the protection seller is obligated to pay the protection buyer for 
the loss, that is, the face value of the underlying bond. Earlier, the CDS contracts used 
to specify that the protection buyer should deliver the defaulted bond to the protection 
seller in order to get the par value of the bond, but, as the contracts have developed, 
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most agreements are settled in cash nowadays. In this situation, the protection seller 
returns only the difference between the par value and the market value or recovery 
value, which is typically determined in a CDS settlement auction. Moreover, this allows 
market participants to speculate on default without owning or getting involved with the 
actual debt itself. (ISDA 2013.) 
 
The triggering credit events are defined by ISDA and, as mentioned above, the terms 
are usually included in the CDS agreement by contracting parties. The six credit events 
under ISDA definitions are: 
 
1. Bankruptcy 
2. Obligation Acceleration 
3. Obligation Default 
4. Failure to Pay 
5. Repudiation/Moratorium 
6. Restructuring 
 
The most commonly incorporated credit events for corporate reference entities are 
failure to pay and bankruptcy, whereas obligation acceleration and obligation default 
are rarely included as they are referring to more technical defaults, like violation of 
covenants, and include considerations. Furthermore, restructuring of the debt is often 
included as a credit event. Restructuring by definition covers situations, in which the 
terms of the obligation have become less favorable to the bond owners than they have 
previously been, such as a cutback in the principal amount or interest, a postponement 
of payment, or a change in seniority or priority of payment. Repudiation or moratorium 
is related to situation where government reference entity disclaims or otherwise 
challenges the legitimacy of the obligation and, thus, it is not commonly incorporated in 
contracts regarding corporate reference entity. (ISDA 2003.) 
 
Because CDS contracts are traded over the counter (OTC), the terms are widely 
negotiable, and thus there are a wide range of unique agreements with diverse terms and 
conditions. The traditional view has been that the hedge buyer holds a CDS to 
expiration and, furthermore, the negotiated terms correspond to the mutual agreement 
between the buyer and the seller. However, as the markets have evolved, CDSs have 
become more and more like tradable assets with a standard form and terms. A typical 
CDS contract is $10 million in protection with maturity of five years and includes the 
quotation for the protection premium per annum.  
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3.2. Credit default swap market structure 
 
As explained earlier in the thesis, the CDS markets have exploded since the first CDS 
developed in 1997, and in mid 2013, the notional CDS amounts outstanding were over 
$25 trillion. Single-name instruments, that is, CDS contracts on single reference entity, 
accounted for $12,5 trillion, whereas multi-name instruments including index products 
accounted for the remaining $10,7 trillion. Of the $12,5 trillion, about 70% of the 
reference counterparties were rated investment grade, 20% non-investment grade, and, 
interestingly, 10% were non-rated. On the other hand, the corresponding net notional 
amount, that is, the sum of the net protection bought, totaled $907 billion for single-
name CDSs. Generally, the net notional positions are the worst case scenarios and 
represent the maximum potential settlements, should the credit events occur. This 
makes the net notional amount substantially smaller than the gross notional amount, 
which indicates the aggregate values for contracts bought or sold. (BIS 2013; Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association 2013.) 
 
CDS markets have a role as alternative trading venues for trading credit risk, regardless 
of whether the position is used for hedging or speculaton. Although, economically the 
same result could be acquired using bonds of the underlying firms, the CDS markets 
function as an alternative, more direct and comprehensive, marketplace for credit risk 
trading. The hedging argument is supported by the findings, that the net notional CDS 
outstanding is positively related to both firm’s assets and debt, thus, revealing that they 
both are significant determinants of CDS market existence and composition. Especially, 
the positive coefficient on debt variable suggests that the CDS markets are truly 
founded on hedging purposes on underlying debt, and that the emerging credit risk 
exposure is protected by CDS. This is also supported by the finding that the net notional 
CDS outstanding is negatively related to ratings AA or higher, the coefficient being 
about 50 % stronger than for the debt outstanding. Moreover, the lost of investment 
grade rating in the last five years is also heavily related to the net notional CDS 
outstanding, referring to the overpowering effects of ratings on credit risk assessment. 
(Oehmke & Zawadowski 2013.) 
 
The impacts of hedging and speculation using CDS rather than bonds should be directly 
reflected to the liquidity of the reference entity’s bonds. The incentive to choose 
between CDSs and bonds is the cost of the trade and, thus, the liquidity measures 
should be affected by the choice. To examine the hedging effects, the reference entities 
that lost investment grade rating are investigated. The lost of investment grade status 
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raises an incentive, sometimes even a requirement, for investors to unload the credit risk 
exposure and acquire more hedge by purchasing CDS protection, hence, causing the net 
notional CDS to increase. The effect of downgrade depends on the liquidity of the 
reference entity’s bond, measured in number of bond trades. For high liquidity firms, 
the increase in net notional CDS reaches 103,6 %, where the downgrade for medium 
liquidity firms accumulates net CDS by an additional 27,6 % and for low liquidity 
firms, the downgrade from investment grade is associated with an increase of additional 
178 %, respectively. The results show evident importance of the CDS markets as an 
alternative credit risk trading venue with respect to corporate bonds, driven by the 
degree of illiquidity in the corporate bond market, and confirm the strong relationship of 
the number of outstanding bonds and the existence of CDS markets and the amount of 
net CDS outstanding. (Oehmke & Zawadowski 2013.) 
 
3.2.1. Market regulation and further discussion 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–2009, discussion about CDS market 
structure and regulation, and whether they should be regulated and overseen, arose 
radically. It is very true that the opaque and obscure market structure and lack of 
regulative action in these bilateral agreements ultimately lead to reducing social 
welfare. However, CDSs, likewise insurance products, allow for more optimal 
allocation of risks in the economy, resulting in increased welfare, if and only if, the 
risks of the CDS seller are minimized properly. Thereby, by “oiling the wheels” and 
preparing the system to allow some volatility, optimal and economically safe use of 
CDSs can be achieved. All in all, even during the financial crisis the CDS markets 
worked well and the OTC agreements themselves did not cause any economically 
dramatic occasions. (Jarrow 2011; Stulz 2010.) 
 
Some economic improvements to the CDS market structure and regulation are presented 
and combined by Jarrow (2011). The effects of the regulatory propositions are 
processed independently and their advantages are evaluated from both economic and 
social point of view. Since financial institutions are regulated by Basel II –regulations 
and are under capital requirements imposed by a Value At Risk (VaR) constraint on the 
equity capital, there are some differences compared to the equity capital computations 
for insurance companies. First, whereas conventional insurance events are independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), credit defaults tend to correlate across firms and 
across time. Second, because of this non-independent quality, the law of large numbers 
will not apply across periods and, moreover, the realized losses of a large sample of 
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CDS agreements will differ from the expected losses of such sample, resulting in higher 
uncertainty and realized losses. Thus, the higher uncertainty should be accounted for 
CDS sellers in VaR calculations, unlike for insurance sellers. Finally, the default 
correlation across firms is conditional on the health and state of the economy: during 
economic boom or expansion, the default correlation is lower, that is, the systematic 
risk is lower. The correlation between defaults increases as the economy slides into 
depression. Again, this will essentially lead to more and more complex capital equity 
calculations for CDS sellers. (Jarrow 2011.) 
 
As pointed out, there are complex restrictions to account for the hidden risks in CDS 
contracts and consequently, there needs to be alternative solutions to improve and 
strengthen the CDS sellers risk position and the system comprehensively. One 
alternative to reduce all counterparty risk to the minimum is the 100 % collateral 
structure. On one hand, this arrangement would protect against comprehensive market 
failures and negative externality of systemic risk. Also, it is easy to implement and take 
into account in calculating capital requirements for protection sellers. On the other 
hand, the CDS trading activity would be reduced remarkably, as the capital 
requirements would skyrocket. In spite of the requirement, the trading would not be 
certainly eliminated: in reinsurance markets, a 100 % collateral is required for the 
reinsurance trading participants. (Jarrow 2011.) 
 
Moreover, exchange-traded CDSs are presented to increase monitoring of CDS traders. 
The exchange could monitor the aforementioned collateral requirement as well as the 
equity capital requirements of the both CDS buyers and sellers. At the same time, lower 
transaction costs would improve the liquidity of CDS contracts with improved 
monitoring. Also there would be more transparency in the market transactions; pricing 
and trading of CDSs. However, the diversity of CDS contracts with different terms and 
conditions complicates the centralized exchange of CDSs. One possibility is to have 
standard contracts traded in the exchange, whereas the unique bilateral agreements are 
traded OTC with 100 % collateral. (Jarrow 2011.) 
 
In addition, close to the current market situation, the role of central clearing parties is 
proposed to be expanded and developed to cover all of the trades between CDS parties. 
Presently there are some clearinghouses already clearing CDS trades, but the operations 
have remained somewhat moderate thus far compared to respective size of the CDS 
markets. Alternatively, instead of regulating the actual CDS trading process, the central 
clearing parties could focus on centralized clearing of collateral, which would fortify the 
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protection against the systematic risk and market failures. At the same time, any 
imbalances and disturbances in collateral would be monitored by a central authority, 
providing more transparency as well as regulative robustness and protection to CDS 
markets. (Jarrow 2011.) 
 
 
3.3. Composition of credit default swaps 
 
A simple way to approach the T-year CDS spread is to observe the yield of T-year bond 
for the reference entity and subtract the T-year risk free rate (the choice of the adequate 
proxy for risk-free rate is discussed later in the Data segment). Essentially, the CDS 
valuation is based on this arbitrage condition and more intuitively, buying an underlying 
bond and protection for the bond should yield the same net return as risk-free rate. On 
the other hand, buying a risk-free bond and selling CDS should result to equal cash 
flows as owning the underlying bond. The relationship between risk-free bond (Rt), 
defaultable bond (Rt + S) and CDS spread (S) is presented in Figure 4. In the case of 
default at time t, the settlement of CDS equals 100 − Y(t), where Y(t) is the market 
value of the underlying note. Thus, the settlement 100 − Y(t) represents the difference 
between the face value and the market value of the underlying. Again, this residual is 
the lawful part secured and settled for the protection buyer in the case of default. 
(Duffie 1999.) 
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Figure 4. Theoretical cash flows of CDS under arbitrage condition. (Duffie 1999.) 
 
 
From the expression above, the risk-neutral default probability can be conducted for the 
reference entity. Furthermore, the present value of the expected loss is a function of the 
present value of both risk-free bond and defaultable bond, and risk-neutral probability 
of default. Thus, it can be written that 
 
 
(7) Xpe− Rt T = Xe− Rt T − Xe−(Rt + S)T	 
 
 
where X = face value of underlying bonds 
 Rt = yield of risk-free bond 
 Rt + S = yield of defaultable bond 
 T = maturity 
 p = probability of default 
 
On the left-hand side of Equation 7, the present value of the expected loss given the 
default is presented. The rates are expressed with continuous compounding and the 
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model assumes that there are no recoveries in the default event. On the right-hand side, 
the present value of the cost of default is expressed, again, using continuous 
compounding and assuming that the underlying bonds are zero-coupon bonds. (Hull & 
White 2000.) 
 
For example, suppose that risk-free zero-coupon bond yields 4 % and corresponding 
zero-coupon defaultable corporate bond yields 6 %, both with a maturity of five years 
and a face value of 100. Thus, the present value of the cost of default using continuous 
compounding is  
 
 
 100e−0,04 × 5 – 100e−0,06 × 5 = 7,7913 
 
 
And the risk-neutral probability of default is therefore 
 
 
 100pe−0,04 × 5 = 7,7913 
 
 
with  p = 0,09516 = 9,52 %. 
 
 
However, the default probabilities implied in bond prices usually differ from this 
theoretical approach. One reason is that the recovery rate is typically not zero, that is, 
the debtors receive some fraction of the face value through the bankruptcy or insolvency 
procedures. Second, this approach assumes that the bonds are zero-coupon bonds, 
which is not the usual case in practice. (Hull & White 2000.) 
 
Furthermore, the difference between CDS prices and bond yield spreads over the risk-
free rate holds only if the maturities meet and bonds trade at par. As mentioned earlier, 
the most common CDS contracts have the maturity of five years as from the moment 
the deal is made, which complicates the examination since the corresponding bond with 
equal maturity is rarely available (Duffie 1999). In practice, there are a number of 
elements other than default risk that cause these deviations between CDS spread and 
bond yield spread, such as liquidity (Longstaff et al. 2005; Huang & Huang 2002), 
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differences in market structure and systematic risk (Elton et al. 2001). Also the choice 
of risk-free rate can affect this so called basis spread, as discussed in Data segment. 
 
Additionally, the basis spread, that is, the spread between the CDS price and bond yield, 
is nonlinearly connected to the credit rating class of the underlying company and to the 
general market conditions, as well. During normal, economically stable times, the basis 
spread lies around or very close to zero, usually on the positive side, if anything. 
However, during the financial crisis the basis spread shows significant negative plunges 
in the time-series pattern, which makes the arbitrage opportunities more convenient than 
for the positive basis spread. Essentially, investor is required to buy the bond and 
simultaneously buy protection, i.e., CDS for the underlying bond. Thus, the resulting 
“risk-free” cash flows equal theoretically to the bond yield minus the CDS price, but in 
practice, there are several risks that are needed to be accounted for, such as funding risk 
and counterparty risk. (Bai & Collin-Dufresne 2011.) 
 
The basis spread widened dramatically after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the 
fall of 2008, and the arbitrage opportunity became very lucrative, especially with the 
firms below investment grade rating. The CDS-bond spreads after the Lehman Brother 
collapsed drop from near zero or slightly positive to negative 250 basis points for 
investment grade firms and down to 650 basis points for high yield firms, respectively. 
However, as mentioned, there are several limits to arbitrage included in the case of 
negative basis trade. First, the counterparty default probability should be revised, since 
the CDS expires worthless should the seller of the protection default. Ultimately, the 
counterparty risk is explicitly related to the correlation between default risk of the 
reference entity and the protection seller, and it should be considered carefully, 
especially in turbulent market conditions. Second, funding cost risk or funding liquidity 
risk should be considered in the arbitrage trade risks, unless the investor has very deep 
pockets. Finally, the quality of the collateral pledged by the borrower can affect the 
CDS-bond basis arbitrage. The better the collateral quality of the reference entity, the 
lower the funding costs and, thus, the more profitable the basis trade. (Bai & Collin-
Dufresne 2011.) 
 
The cross-sectional analysis implies that all the aforementioned risk factors are 
significant and mostly of expected sign in explaining CDS-bond basis. Counterparty 
risk and funding cost risk both have negative sign, whereas the collateral quality has 
positive sign in the whole sample period spanning from January 2006 to September 
2009. Furthermore, the sample is divided into subsamples consisting of investment 
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grade and high yield subsamples and sub-periods before the financial crisis, the crisis 
period before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the crisis after Lehman Brothers 
collapse. Interestingly, the risk factors experience a notable jump as does the total 
variation explained by the model: After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the R-squared 
increases from less than five to around 20 % for high yield firms and around 10 % for 
investment grade firms, which is remarkably higher than in the crisis period prior to 
Lehman collapse. Considering the dynamics regarding the basis trading, one can see 
that the economic contribution of the risk factors is driven by seriousness and depth of 
the uncertainty and market conditions, and also, by the risk characteristics of the firm, 
such as credit rating. The behavior of these risk factors between high yield and 
investment grade is nonlinear and unbalanced, driven by counterparty risk and “flight-
to-quality” for investment grade firms, and counterparty and funding risk together with 
collateral quality for below investment grade firms, respectively. (Bai & Collin-
Dufresne 2011.) 
 
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) study basis spread and CDS price discovery before 
the financial crisis, using data of both US and European CDS contracts from January 
2001 to June 2002. The empirical results are multidimensional and arise many 
questions. First, the average basis spread seems to be very close to zero or, if anything, 
positive when using swap rates as a risk-free proxy for interest rate. In turn, the CDS-
bond basis turns negative for almost every reference entity when using government 
bond yields (5-year Treasuries or German government bonds) as a risk-free rate. The 
finding that during normal market conditions the basis spread is close to zero or slightly 
positive is consistent with Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011).  
 
Second, CDS markets lead the bond markets in price discovery of credit risk and 
changes in credit conditions, providing timely information. Creating an upper bound to 
credit spread (at least on normal times), the CDS markets contribute around 80 % of 
price discovery, before the credit risk is priced in bond prices (lower bound of spread). 
Finally, the lead-lag relationship between the credit risk determinants and CDS prices 
and credit spreads are examined. Because the CDS prices lead credit spread in how fast 
the information is incorporated, the credit spreads react much greater to the changes in 
credit determinants, such as long-term interest rates, slope of the yield curve, equity 
market returns. Although the magnitude of these macro-variables is much greater for 
credit spread than for CDS spread, the firm-specific variables, such as implied 
volatilities and equity returns, act conversely. The results show no statistical nor 
economical significance to firm-specific determinants and credit spreads, giving some 
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support to structural credit risk models. However, the unequal effects of the credit risk 
determinants can lead to unequal results in basis spreads, leading ultimately greater to 
arbitrage opportunities. (Blanco et al. 2005.) 
 
Together with the price discovery element, the dynamic effects of the risk determinants 
could also lead to converse arbitrage opportunities, as recognized earlier by Bai and 
Collin-Dufresne (2011). Combining the impact of market conditions and empirical 
findings of Blanco et al. (2005) on the nonlinear lead-lag effects of risk determinants 
and CDS spreads could open up more and more negative basis arbitrage opportunities, 
which are easier to access and, on occasion, more profitable than positive basis arbitrage 
trades.  
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4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREDIT RISK AND CREDIT 
DEFAULT SWAPS 
 
 
The literature on the structural approach on CDS spread is rather covered, since the 
subject is both theoretically appealing and, thus, academically more approved. The 
effects of solely theoretical determinants of default risk in CDS premia is studied by 
Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009). The linear relationship between actual market CDS 
spread and leverage, volatility and risk-free interest rate is investigated using both bid 
and ask quotes of credit default swaps on senior debt in 1999–2002, which was truly 
booming growth period for CDS markets. Both cross-sectional and time-series 
dimensions are covered, meaning that the effects can be estimated between companies 
and also in time for a given company. 
 
The time-series estimation results are strongly in line with the underlying theory, 
suggesting that equity volatility, leverage and risk-free rate are heavily incorporated in 
CDS spreads. The coefficients for volatility and leverage are always positive, whereas 
the coefficient for 10-year government bond has a negative sign, as expected. For lower 
rated firms, the magnitude of estimation coefficients is two to three times stronger than 
for higher rated firms, which is consistent with the basic nature of structural credit risk 
models as they are more vulnerable to changes in fundamental footings. For all the 
companies, 1 % increase in annualized equity volatility inflates the CDS bid quote by 
0,8 basis points and ask quote by 1,5 basis points, but the effect increases to between 
1,1 and 2,3 basis points for lower rated companies, respectively. Moreover, the leverage 
effect acts in the same fashion: a 1 % increase in firm leverage causes the CDS spread 
to widen between 4,8 and 7,3 basis points, whereas for the lower rated firms experience 
a 6–10 basis points rupture in CDS premium. Interestingly, the level of risk-free interest 
rate exhibit a great deal of variation across ratings, the estimation coefficient for lower 
rated firms being more sensitive to interest rate of long maturity government bond than 
the higher rated firms. Although, the estimate of risk-free rate is strong, reaching to 
almost -60 basis points for lower rated firms, it can be overestimated and biased because 
of the choice of 10-year yield as a risk-free proxy. Regardless, the results show robust 
evidence that the theoretical structural variables perform sufficiently in explaining CDS 
premia. (Ericsson et al. 2009.)  
 
The relationship between accounting-based models and CDS spread is rather 
unexplored because of the inconveniences regarding financial firms, although the 
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financial ratio analysis in widely used and easily applied method. Das, Hanouna and 
Sarin (2009) use CDS spreads of publicly traded non-financial US firms together with 
quarterly accounting information. In the analysis, a 10-variable approach is used to 
estimate the accounting-based credit risk. Only sale growth and income growth 
variables were found insignificant in the model that used only accounting information. 
Furthermore, equity market information, such as stock return, volatility and distance-to-
default measure obtained from Merton’s model, was included in the analysis. All 
market-based variables were found significant in the model that did not include 
accounting information, suggesting the rather important role of structural credit risk 
determinants in explaining CDS spread.  
 
A comprehensive model that combined both the accounting and market information 
yielded different results from the previous models. The most essential differences 
between the models were found in volatility and 3-month T-Bill rate. The explanatory 
powers of the models were 64,30 % for accounting model and 63,45 % for market 
model, respectively, whereas the comprehensive model yielded adjusted R-squared of 
71,40 %. Thus, the results indicate that accounting and market information should be 
considered as complements rather than substitutes. Even though the accounting 
variables lose some of their economic significance in explaining the CDS spread in 
comprehensive model, they still retain their statistical significance. This suggests that 
there are certain misty, opaque part of credit risk left unexplained when dealing strictly 
with structural, theoretical approach, and, that with meaningful accounting-based 
determinants, this curtain of obscurity can be revealed and exposed slightly further (Das 
et al. 2009.) 
 
Benkert (2004) uses accounting and equity information in the examination of CDS 
prices. The analysis covers past profitability, leverage and interest coverage and 
includes ratios of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to net sales, long-term debt 
to total assets, and EBIT to interest expense. EBIT to net sales and long-term debt to 
total assets were found significant when including only accounting ratios in the 
regression. When historical volatility was included in the analysis, the ratios were still 
significant but lost some effectiveness. Furthermore, introducing implied volatility to 
the model caused the EBIT to net sales variable to lose significance. The results suggest 
persistently the importance of the structural credit risk determinants and are similar to 
the findings of Das et al. (2009). When examining the effects of historical volatility and 
implied volatility in a comparative manner, the implied volatility seems to have slightly 
more contribution to the CDS spread than the historical volatility: one percent increase 
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in the former leads to 6,3 % increase in CDS spread, whereas for the latter, the effects is 
around 4,5 %, respectively. Yet, both the volatility measures are statistically very highly 
significant and give parallel results, again, suggesting the salience of structural 
determinants. 
 
Interestingly, including credit ratings to the regression leads to a sign change in 
profitability (EBIT to net sales) measure, while the other variables retain the correct 
signs. This finding suggests that the credit ratings capture the matter of profitability 
ratio more effectively. Also the differences between the credit ratings coefficients are 
remarkable: when moving from investment grade BBB-rating to non-investment grade 
BB-rating, the coefficients jump from 0,53 to 8,42 with very high significance. In brief, 
ceteris paribus, the CDS spreads of BBB-rated (investment grade) or BB-rated (non-
investment grade) firms are around 53 % or 842 % higher than the reference group of 
AA rated firms, respectively. This can be as a result of the investment rules of 
institutional investors; some investors are prohibited from investing in speculative grade 
bonds and they are obliged to cut down their holdings in the case of a downgrade. 
(Benkert 2004.) 
 
Bai and Wu (2012) study the usefulness of firm fundamentals in explaining CDS 
spreads in addition to market-based or “Mertonian” variables. They form different 
valuation models to determine, which determinants are the most contributable to CDS 
prices. The models range from distance-to-default raw valuation (RCDS) and risk-
adjusted two-variable Mertonian credit risk valuation including leverage and volatility 
(MCDS) to model including additional firm fundamentals via a Bayesian shrinkage 
method together with market-based variables (WCDS). The risk-adjusted market-based 
valuation model (MCDS) reaches rather high explanatory power of 65 %, suggesting 
that the Merton model provides generally a good starting point for assessing credit risk 
and CDS spreads. Furthermore, when firm fundamentals are introduced, the overall 
explanatory power of WCDS model increases to 77 %, the 12 percentage point 
difference being highly statistically significant, thus, showing strong contribution of 
additional firm fundamentals.  
 
Not surprisingly, the WCDS model with multiple firm fundamentals outperforms the 
MCDS valuation model, but the truly meaningful point of interest is the significance 
and usefulness of the included variables. To study the cross-sectional contribution of 
firm characteristics, the residuals from Merton model are mapped with characteristics 
divided into percentiles. First, the major two financial leverage measures, total liabilities 
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to market cap and total debt to total assets, act as anticipated: higher leverage leads to 
higher CDS spread, especially within the top percentiles (highest leveraged). On the 
contrary, interest rate coverage has a negative and more linear correlation with CDS 
spread, as expected. Second, the most influential liquidity measures appear to be EBIT 
to total assets and retained earnings to total assets, whereas the working capital to total 
assets has rather small impact on CDS spread. Both of the significant liquidity measures 
perform similarly as better profitability reduces CDS spread, exceptionally at the tails. 
Interestingly, low or negative retained earnings, meaning deprived cashflows from 
firm’s investments and business operations, leads to notably wider spread, highlighting 
the importance of profitability of firm’s initial investments. (Bai & Wu 2012.) 
 
Finally, the contributions of the risk characteristics measured by size (total market cap), 
momentum and implied volatility to realized volatility (crash risk) are examined. The 
firm risk characteristics are assessed rather highly in the CDS spreads: large size and 
positive momentum contribute to lower CDS spread, whereas impact of higher implied 
volatility is oppositely leading to higher spreads. Time series analysis of the variables 
supports the presented findings, but since the data ranges from 2003 to 2009, some of 
the heavily market-related variables, such as momentum and total liabilities to market 
cap, are affected by the stock market turmoil in 2007–2009.  On the other hand, ratios of 
interest rate coverage, EBIT to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, implied 
volatility to realized volatility and size appear to be also surprisingly robust in time 
series analysis, supporting their usefulness in contributing to credit risk. (Bai & Wu 
2012.) 
 
Economically and practically, different valuation models can be utilized in forecasting 
the market movements and creating investment strategies for trading CDSs. Bai and Wu 
(2012) argue that since the firm fundamental-based (WCDS) model reflects the cross-
sectional variation significantly well, the remaining fraction not captured by the model 
is probably driven by non-fundamental elements, for example supply-demand shocks, 
and, furthermore, the WCDS valuation model could be used in forecasting the future 
market movements. The correlations between current WCDS valuation and future 
market CDS quote at one- and four-week horizons were -7 % and -12 %, whereas for 
the MCDS valuation the correlations were -6 % and -10 %, respectively. The findings 
suggest that the market quote of CDS will deteriorate in the future if the fundamental 
valuation models currently suggest lower spread. This mean reversion of the CDS 
spreads is statistically significant and has economical and practical contribution as it can 
be utilized in investment strategies, for example, going long in CDSs under the 
 46 
“fundamental par” and going short in CDSs above the fundamental valuation. Based on 
the WCDS valuation, the presented hypothetical investment strategy yields over 32 % 
excess returns with standard deviation of 1,97 % (both annualized) in one-week horizon 
and extending the investment to four-week period the strategy yields still impressive 
20,55 % with standard deviation of 3,81 %, respectively.  
 
The regime dependence of CDS spread determinants is documented by Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008). They use iTraxx CDS indices ranging from June 2004 to June 2007, 
which covers the time just before the financial crisis period started in 2007, to 
investigate the effects of different market-based determinants to CDS spreads in diverse 
market conditions. Without the regime specification, the linear regression model finds 
only weak explanatory power for determinants, such as stock market volatility, stock 
market return and interest rate. Most remarkably, the linear approach suggests that the 
lagged dependent variable is the most significant determinant in explaining current CDS 
spread, that is, there is first-order autocorrelation in the CDS indices. The results 
suggest that the CDS indices may behave differently in dynamic market regimes.  
 
The state-dependency, that is, the dynamic relationship between market conditions and 
different determinants, is studied by using Markov switching regression. The results 
state clearly, that the determinants evolve in different regimes. For non-financial firms, 
the impacts of equity market volatility, equity returns and interest rates intensify 
significantly when moving from low volatility to high volatility regime, whereas the 
lagged effect remains approximately unchanged. In low volatility periods, an increase in 
volatility and a decrease in stock index returns are followed by higher CDS spreads, 
which is supported by theory. However, during high volatility regime, the effect of 
equity returns turns insignificant, suggesting that the implied volatility is more 
deterministic during turbulent and uncertain market conditions than the stock market 
returns. Moreover, the effect of interest rates on CDS spreads increases from low 
volatility regime -0,41 basis points to -2,83 basis points in high volatility regime for 
non-financial firms. Again, the finding is backed by theory, as the increasing interest 
rates lead to narrower spread. Overall, the effect of all CDS determinants seem to 
accelerate once the volatility and uncertainty have entered the market, augmenting the 
structural determinants of credit risk. Finally, the escalation of structural determinants in 
high volatility regimes leads ultimately to over four times higher hedge ratios for non-
financials. This regime dependency of equity risk should be considered carefully when 
entering or hedging a CDS position. (Alexander & Kaeck 2008.) 
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Avino and Nneji (2012) study the autocorrelation of European iTraxx CDS index and 
its structural determinants in different volatility regimes during the period 2005–2010, 
which covers both the low volatility normal market conditions and the high volatility 
debt crisis period as well. The structural credit risk model components; equity returns, 
implied volatilities, risk free rate and slope of yield curve, are tested both linearly and 
nonlinearly, using Markov switching model for different volatility regimes. Both 
approaches are first order predictive models, that is, the current CDS spread is predicted 
by changes in previous day’s credit risk determinants. A simple first order 
autocorrelation test of shows that the CDS spread is not serially correlated for non-
financials, but there is some evidence of autocorrelation for financial sector. The lagged 
linear structural model shows some predictive evidence for equity returns and yield 
curve for non-financial firms, although all of the coefficients are of the correct sign. 
 
The Markov switching regression provides more viable results for both structural model 
and simple first order autoregressive model. As discussed before, the CDS spreads and 
credit risk determinants are depended on the underlying market conditions and their 
relationship is dynamic and nonlinear in respect to predominant market environment, as 
shown by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) for example. The results support the 
aforementioned perception of dynamic relationship, suggesting that when moving from 
low volatility to high volatility state, the risk determinants rebound from their normal 
backwater and become economically more and more significant. For example, the low 
volatility regime estimates for equity return and risk-free interest rate are -18,1 and -4,8, 
whereas during the high volatility regime, the estimates jump up to -61,3 for the former 
and -14,5 for the latter, respectively. Interestingly, during the suspenseful high volatility 
regimes, the autoregressive term does not gain any statistical significance and has a 
negative sign, which is probably due to the sudden retreat from the CDS positions 
during the deepest period of the European debt crisis. (Avino & Nneji 2012.) 
 
Furthermore, the predictive information of credit risk determinants and their dynamic 
nature can be turned into trading rules, should the effect be great enough to be explored 
by investors. By using the Markov switching structural model, the results show that 
there are some predictable patterns, at least when compared to simple first order 
autoregressive model. Then again, the random walk model also generates forecasts that 
are different from autoregressive model, which arises the question of whether there are 
exploitable patterns that could be utilized economically. The trading rule involves not 
CDS trading, but bond trading instead, so that the bond price follows the cited basis 
spread relationship between CDS spread and bond yield: If the forecasted change in the 
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CDS spread differs negatively from current spread, then the spread is expected to 
decrease, causing a decrease in bond yield and, thus, an increase in the price of the 
bond. However, the trading rule concludes to have no economic significance in terms of 
(risk-adjusted) returns nor applicability. (Avino & Nneji 2012.) 
 
Empirical literature on the anatomy of credit risk determinants and CDS spread during 
the financial crisis of 2007–2009 is somewhat scarce. The firm-level fundamental 
variables of stock price, volatility, leverage, size and profitability all tend to strengthen 
in the period of financial crisis. Size of total assets is negatively associated to CDS 
spreads in the normal economic conditions but has a positive sign in the crisis period. 
Financial firms are included in the analysis of CDS spreads in different regimes, which 
can bias the results. When comparing CDS spread determinants between investment 
grade and speculative grade firms, the most remarkable differences occur in volatility, 
leverage and size variables. The estimates for volatility and leverage are much greater 
for investment grade firms than non-investment grade. Again, the sign of profitability 
estimate is changed when moving from investment grade to non-investment grade, 
which confirms that profitability is captured more efficiently by credit rating. Also the 
size estimate turns sign correspondingly from positive to negative when crossing the 
rating threshold. (Tang & Yan 2012.) 
 
In contrast to US financial crisis, the CDS spread determinants during the European 
debt crisis in 2007–2009 differ from previously presented findings. Again, the size 
estimate changes sign in different regimes, being negative during low volatility regime 
and, conversely, turning to positive in the time high uncertainty. The significant 
accounting variables, which are retained earnings to total assets, total liabilities to 
equity, and interest rate coverage, hold their expected sign and significance in both 
crisis and pre-crisis periods with minor alterations. The most significant and effective 
estimate is annualized equity volatility variable, but in contrast to previous findings the 
impact decreases in the crisis period. On the other hand, investors seem to appreciate 
liquidity during the turbulent market conditions, whereas liquidity turns out statistically 
insignificant during pre-crisis period. Similarly, price to cash flow (P/CF) ratio, which 
is a valuation ratio that is more invulnerable to accounting rules, gains statistical 
significance in the crisis period, although the economical contribution remains rather 
modest. (Trujillo-Ponce, Samaniego-Medina & Cardone-Riportella 2012.) 
 
Interestingly, the explanatory power of the model increases considerably in the crisis 
period with R-squared of 77,41 % (63,16 %) in the crisis (pre-crisis) period. This 
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finding may result from increasing sensitivity of CDS spreads during the periods of 
high uncertainty. Also, the flatness of CDS spreads before the crisis period may result to 
lower explanatory power of the credit risk variables. However, the findings provide 
robust support to the aforementioned nonlinear dynamics of the credit risk and 
exogenous (market) conditions as well as to the contribution and feasibility of credit 
risk determinants, structural or accounting-based.  Again, the results suggest that the 
accounting and market models should not be considered as substitutes but as 
complements. (Trujillo-Ponce et al. 2012.) 
 
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2012) examine the reverse connection between credit 
risk, firm characteristics and credit default swaps, and whether the introduction of CDS 
lead to ultimately higher credit risk. The main incentives to increased credit risk lie in 
the monitoring hypothesis: once the CDS have been introduced, the creditors may 
neglect monitoring of the reference firm, since their positions are hedged. Thus, the 
underlying firm could accept and take on riskier and riskier projects, eventually ending 
up with increased higher credit risk. Also, since the debt can be protected with CDS, the 
debtors may expand the supply of credit beyond normally acceptable threshold, making 
borrowers more vulnerable. 
 
Indeed, several findings arise when examining this reverse relationship between CDS 
inception and credit risk. First, the probability of bankruptcy increases with the quantity 
of live CDS contracts outstanding. Hence, the CDS works as a cycle increasing the risk 
of default and, at the same time, protecting from the default. The effect works also 
adversely: credit risk decreases as the number of CDS traded is reduced. Second, 
leverage of the underlying firm seem to increase once the CDS trading begins, 
supporting the idea of expansion in the supply of credit on the side of debtor. 
(Subrahmanyam et al. 2012.) 
 
The results suggest that large firms, measured in market value of equity, and firms with 
high past stock returns have smaller probability of getting downgraded or going default, 
whereas the leverage and equity volatility affect conversely. Moreover, when 
controlling for firms with CDS and non-CDS firms, the evidence of the effect on credit 
risk is rather mixed: In general, CDS firms have an increased likelihood of getting 
downgraded but decreased probability of bankruptcy compared to non-CDS firms. Once 
the CDS trading launches, both the chance of downgrade and default increase, implying 
that the appearance of credit events is more likely after the trading begins: the odds for 
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downgrade are twice as high and for bankruptcy even 10 times as high as they are for 
non-CDS firms. (Subrahmanyam et al. 2012.) 
 
Additionally, the reverse relationship between credit risk and CDSs is studied by 
Peristiani and Savino (2011) by regressing both structural and accounting-based credit 
risk determinants on distance-to-default measure of non-financial CDS firms. The data 
spans from 2001–2008, covering the economic downturn of the dot-com collapse in 
2001 and the very beginning of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The results are 
intriguingly similar to results of Subrahmanyam et al. (2012) presented above, 
suggesting that during 2004–2008 the CDS firms experienced a remarkable increase in 
default measured in structural distance-to-default. Exceptionally, year 2008 shows 
significant increasing effect in default risk (declining distance-to-default) as well as in 
bankruptcy odds ratio with actual bankruptcies. Furthermore, by studying the 
relationship between distance-to-default and CDS, the results imply that the main 
contributors to lower distance-to-default are, unsurprisingly, stock return and volatility 
as well as market capitalization. Leverage ratio total debt to total assets together with 
profitability ratio EBITDA to total assets gained also significance in explaining the 
distance-to-default, leverage being the most dominant. Interestingly, the closing gap of 
distance-to-default between CDS and non-CDS firms in 2007–2008 does not occur in 
actual bankruptcy rates in corresponding period: of the 2677 non-CDS firms only 
1,23 % went under in 2008, whereas of the 527 CDS firms 3,42 % filed for bankruptcy, 
respectively. The 2,57 times larger bankruptcy odds for CDS firms present undisputed 
evidence of the depth of the financial crisis of 2007–2009, particularly for the CDS 
markets.  
 
On the trading point of view, the probability of CDS trading is positively connected to 
size of the firm (measured in total assets), leverage, volatility and certain accounting-
based variables, such as EBIT to total assets, working capital to total assets, and cash to 
total assets. Interestingly, profitability ratio return on assets (ROA) does not appear to 
be significant. In short, firms with generally good credit quality are more prone to have 
CDS trading. Furthermore, the difference in CDS trading between rated and unrated 
firms is rather wide, suggesting that firms rated by credit rating agency are more likely 
to have increased CDS trading than the unrated firms and, moreover, if the given rating 
is above the investment grade threshold, the CDS trading accelerates remarkably. 
(Peristiani & Savino 2011.) 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In this chapter the data and the methodology are presented. First section is focused on 
describing the data and its source, range and format. Later, the econometric models are 
introduced. Generally, the data spans from December 2007 to the end of 2012 including 
CDS prices for 207 non-financial US firms listed in the S&P 500 index. Data for CDS 
prices, accounting and financial ratios, and risk-free rate is collected from Datastream 
(Thomson Reuters) with the assistance of the department of Accounting and Finance at 
the University of Vaasa. With more than five years of daily quotes including various 
sectors, the goal is for the results to be fairly adaptable and general to the CDS prices of 
most non-financial firms. 
 
 
5.1. CDS prices 
 
The CDS data consists of the daily CDS price quotes of 207 U.S. non-financial firms 
presented in Appendix 1. The quotes are mid prices at close of each day and the prices 
are denoted in basis points (bp), 100 basis points being equal to one percent. As 
suggested in previous studies, the data is limited to the most traded contract type, that is, 
single-name five-year contract on unsecured senior debt. Thus, the CDS prices should 
reflect the effects of explanatory variables in a similar fashion. Another notable matter 
is the equal maturities of the CDS contracts, which allows the comparison of the results 
without any adjustments. The CDS prices acquired from the Datastream database are 
readily quoted in the form of spreads, so no adjustment is required for the quotes. 
 
 
5.2. Risk-free rate 
 
Rate of the five-year U.S. Treasury note is used as proxy for risk-free rate. The yield is 
obtained from Datastream and represents daily closing price. The use of Treasury curve 
as a benchmark riskless curve is motivated by most of empirical tests in finance. A 
government bond has theoretically no fundamental credit risk, and hence its yield 
should be equal to the risk-free interest rate. Also, the effects of the changes in risk-free 
rate to the CDS spreads are estimated in the empirical analysis. Moreover, five-year 
Treasury curve is easy to match accurately with five-year CDS contracts. 
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Although the Treasury rate is the most obvious choice, swap rates are also used to proxy 
the risk-free interest rate (Blanco, Brennan & Marsh 2005). Hull, Predescu and White 
(2004) argue that the market uses the rate that is 10 basis points less than the swap rate 
as a benchmark risk-free rate. They point out that swap rates are very low risk (not 
entirely risk-free), liquid rates and that they are not under any special taxation unlike 
Treasury bonds. Longstaff et al. (2005) use different benchmark risk-free rates and find 
that swap rates can overestimate the size credit component as they account for both 
credit and default components. On the one hand, Treasury rates may be affected by 
taxation treatment, benchmark status and liquidity, whereas on the other hand, swap 
rates are not riskless since they include default and counterparty risk components. 
(Blanco et al. 2005).  
 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, the five-year U.S. government Treasury rate is 
chosen for benchmark risk-free rate. The aim is to acquire evidence for the effects of the 
risk-free rate on CDS spreads and credit risk, not the vanishingly small differences in 
the dynamics of different risk-free proxies, and therefore, the Treasury rate serves the 
intentions of the credit risk analysis meaningfully. Furthermore, since the analysis is 
based on quarterly frequency, the quarterly rates are obtained from the initial daily 
dataset.  
 
 
5.3. Accounting information 
 
From the substantial set of accounting variables available, the most relevant and quoted 
ratios are included in the analysis. The selected variables should cover the three 
dimensions of firm’s health: liquidity, profitability and solidity. In Altman’s (1968) 
original Z-score, all the dimensions are covered but the extensive analysis can fall short. 
The ZETA model extends the variables including interest rate coverage, size and 
capitalization (Altman et al. 1977).  
 
Furthermore, considering the empirical findings of Benkert (2004), Das et al. (2009) 
and Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012) about the combination of relevant accounting ratios, 
equity market information and credit default swap spreads, the following variables are 
chosen: Return on assets, retained earnings to total assets, interest coverage, current 
ratio, total debt to total assets, total debt to common equity, working capital to total 
assets, and size of total assets. Accounting information is acquired from interim 
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statements, i.e., quarterly financial statements in 2007Q4–2012Q4, which leads to total 
of 21 quarterly observations of each variable for each firm.  
 
 
5.4. Equity market information 
 
Both equity return and volatility of equity return are obtained from stock market data 
and they represent the market-model variables in the empirical part. These are the two 
most important firm-level fundamental market variables along with the leverage 
(default threshold) according to the structural model of Merton (1974), and thus they are 
included in the analysis. The equity market performance variables, earnings per share 
and dividends per share, are also included in the analysis and they represent firm-
specific performance ratios similarly to accounting-based variables. 
 
The stock market information of the included firms consists of daily observations of 
adjusted closing prices for each of the firms. Again, because of the quarterly nature of 
the interim data, the stock market data is transformed into quarterly returns instead of 
daily returns. Thus, the returns represent the past quarterly stock performance for the 
firm, prior to the end of the quarter. However, the volatility measures are presented in 
annualized form, which is a typical and more informative way of presenting the effects 
of volatility. The effects of volatility are assessed in a similar fashion to the 
aforementioned stock return effects. 
 
 
5.5. Methodology 
 
In the empirical approach, the panel data features of the dataset are exploited, which 
leads to a sufficient number of observations for each quarter. Moreover, panel data 
allows controlling for unobservable variation among the sample firms, which should 
ultimately lead to more reliable and robust estimation results. The ordinary least squares 
panel regression can be written as follows: 
 
 
(8) 𝑦!"   = α+ β𝑥!" + 𝑢!" 
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with time series from 1 to T and cross sections from 1 to N. In Equation 8, i subscripts 
the cross section, whereas t subscripts the time period. Thus, the respective number of 𝑁  ×  𝑇 observations is estimated using panel regression. Accordingly, the presented 
dataset leads to total of 207  ×  21 =   4347 observations for a single variable. However, 
due to some missing data points regarding some of the variables, the eventual sample 
size can vary slightly. Naturally, the number of observations is included in the 
estimation outputs. 
 
For each firm and quarter a least squares panel regression is estimated to test the first 
hypothesis, that is, the effects of accounting ratios to the CDS spread. As a dependent 
variable the natural logarithm of CDS spread is estimated by the accounting variables 
presented earlier in the data section. The results are compared to the expected signs and 
evaluated for further estimations. Thus, the most significant accounting variables 
contributing to CDS spread are chosen into the comprehensive model that includes both 
accounting and equity market variables. Hence, a comparison between different models 
can be estimated from the adjusted R-squared, which accounts for the number of 
variables included. Also, the statistical and economic significance of the variables are 
considered regarding the comprehensive model. This approach yields three different 
models: only accounting information, only market information, and comprehensive 
model. 
 
For accounting based model, the estimation yields the following equation: 
 
 
(9) log(CDSit) = β0 + β1ROAit + β2RE/TAit + β3COVit + β4CRit + β5TL/TAit + 
β6TL/CEit + β7log(TA)it + β8WC/TAit + εit 
 
Equation 9 presents the model for accounting-based determinants of CDS spread. 
Expected signs of the variables are presented earlier in the hypothesis section. Next, the 
market-based variables are estimated separately as follows: 
 
 
(10) log(CDSit) = β0 + β1RETit + β2VOLit + β3LEVit + β4EPSit + β5DPSit + β6RFt + 
εit 
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where RETit and VOLit are market-based variables for historical stock return and 
volatility, EPSit denotes earnings per share, and DPSit denotes dividends per share for 
firm i and time t, respectively, and RFt is five-year U.S. Treasury rate.  
 
To account for time-series trend in CDS spreads, both Equation 9 and Equation 10 are 
adjusted for quarterly development in spreads. As discussed earlier, the connection of 
high volatility regimes and CDS spreads is dynamic, and as two utterly opposite 
economic regimes are distinguished in the dataset, this needs to be accounted for. The 
reference point of time for the adjustment is 2008Q4, which is the highest point of 
credit risk in the sample and, as well the folding point of the financial crisis period in 
terms of credit risk. Thus, the distinction between two time periods and economic 
conditions can be observed in CDS spreads, as suggested in theoretical framework 
section. The time-series trend variable has also quadratic version that captures the 
nonlinear development of credit risk. 
 
Furthermore, to test the impact of adding market-based information in explaining credit 
spread, i.e., creating a comprehensive model, Equation 11 is constructed as follows: 
 
 
(11) log(CDSit) = β0 + β1ROAit + β2RE/TAit + β3log(TA)it + β4RETit + β5VOLit + 
β6LEVit + εit  
 
To test the hypothesis 3, the observations are simply divided into to sections by the time 
regime. Again, a least squares regression is applied to estimate whether the significance 
and magnitude of explanatory variables are unequal in different economic regimes. To 
examine the effect of financial crisis on CDS spreads, the advantageous composition of 
panel data is exploited and the sample period is divided into sub-periods according to 
the economic conditions. The first sub-period spans from December 2007 to June 2009, 
and thus represents the period of financial crisis. The second sub-period, covering the 
time period from July 2009 to the end of 2012, represents the time of recovery and 
expansion, as per the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER 2010). Hence, it 
follows: 
 
(12) log(CDSit) = β0 + β1ROAit + β2RE/TAit + β3log(TA)it + β4RETit + β5VOLit + 
β6LEVit + εit 
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Dividing the sample period to sub-periods allows examining the impact of financial 
crisis on CDS spreads on a general level, as the dataset is strictly twofold in nature: The 
first period from December 2007 to June 2009 represents the financial crisis and the 
second period from June 2009 to end 2012 represents the healthy expansion period as a 
reference period, as suggested by National Bureau of Economic Research (2010). Thus, 
for crisis period t = 2007Q4, 2008Q1 … 2009Q2, and for recovery period t = 2009Q3, 
2009Q4 … 2012Q4 respectively, for every firm i. 
 
Finally, to account for the possible unobserved elements and heterogeneity among 
sample firms, the panel feature of the data is used to perform cross-section fixed-effects 
regression. Thus, controlling for unobserved or omitted variables among firms by 
employing firm fixed-effects regression (together with aforementioned time-series 
adjustment), the results should supposedly robustify from the initial estimation results. 
Furthermore, the fixed-effects panel estimation offers many important attributes, such 
as the contribution of the independent variable on the explained variable and the impact 
it incurs as it changes. The cross-section fixed-effects regression can be written as 
follows: 
 
 
(13)  𝑦!" = α+   β𝑥!" + [γ𝑧! + 𝑢!"] 
 
 
where zi is the unobserved, constant variable for firm i. Incorporating this exclusive 
constant term into the constant term α for every firm, then the new constant term can be 
written as α! = α+ γ𝑧!. Replacing the unobservable term zi by α! and incorporating the 
composed term into Equation 13, it can be written as follows: 
 
 
(14) 𝑦!" = α! + β𝑥!" + 𝑢!" 
 
 
where α! is the exclusive constant for each firm, cross section fixed effect. 
 
Again, the aforementioned adjustments will contribute to the underlying model and the 
underlying theory of variables in a practical manner rather than fine distillery between 
proxies, such as between Treasury rate or swap rate. Thus, the model accounts for 
overall significance of a given variable in broader perspective, calibrating and 
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specifying it to the effects of credit risk in general level, making it more practical and 
robust to fine modeling preferences. Certainly, the important credit risk variables show 
significance in both individual and aggregate level, should the variable have relevance, 
reliability and validity.  
 
5.5.1. Quantile regression 
 
To examine the asymmetric credit risk distribution and risk dynamics, quantile 
regression is employed. In general, this approach examines the impacts of given 
conditioning variables on the quantiles of the dependent variable, providing estimates of 
linear relationship between explanatory variables and a chosen quantile of the CDS 
spread. Hence, the unbalanced effects of credit risk determinants on CDS spread can be 
detected and statistically tested, should there exist asymmetry.  
 
The most attractive attribute of quantile regression is that it makes no assumption 
regarding the error term normality, and thus there are no strict distributional 
requirements and assumptions. Obviously, this property offers considerable model 
robustness compared to the OLS regression and its assumptions of normality. 
Therefore, quantile regression offers a unique approach to study the credit risk 
asymmetry as well as unbalanced and dissimilar effects of credit risk determinants on 
CDS spread. Furthermore, this approach is combined to the periodic distinction between 
crisis and post-crisis periods for deeper examination of asymmetric behavior of credit 
risk.  
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6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
In this section, the descriptive statistics of CDS data and both the accounting and 
market-based variables are introduced. Moreover, the estimation results based on the 
aforementioned estimation methods are presented and analyzed later in the section.  
 
This section will start by presenting the development of CDS spread during the sample 
period, followed by analysis of the behavior of the general credit risk in the time of 
crisis as well as post-crisis. This approach will allow for more comprehensive analysis 
for the estimation results and possible differences in results during crisis period and 
post-crisis. By recognizing the dynamics of credit risk progression in the sample period, 
the differences can be examined in a more profound manner and possibly connected to 
(or distinguished from) the findings of previous literature on CDS spreads.  
 
 
6.1. CDS spread development 
 
In this section, the descriptive statistics of the data are presented and analyzed before 
the actual estimation analysis. This approach helps to perceive the behavior of the CDS 
spreads and credit risk during different states of economy. When the data is described 
and narrated adequately before the deeper analyses, the reasons and causes behind the 
credit dynamics are more easily approached and comprehended.  
 
First, the evolution of credit risk is presented in terms of CDS spread description 
starting from rampaging financial crisis and finishing to recovering end of 2012. 
Figures 5 and 6 present the CDS spread development, providing both mean and median 
values for the dataset. 
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Figure 5. Mean of CDS spreads in 2007Q4–2012Q4 (in bps). 
 
 
Mean of CDS spread over the risk-free rate during 2007Q4–2012Q4 is presented in 
Figure 5. The shaded area marks the period of financial crisis for easier distinction 
between different economic regimes within the sample period. As Figure 5 evidently 
shows, the general level of credit risk rises sky-high during the financial crisis starting 
from 76,88 basis points at the end of 2007 and winding up at sample-high 274,13 basis 
points in the last quarter of 2008. Since the turn of the year 2008–2009, optimistic 
atmosphere and signs of recovery started to show up little by little, leading to 
remarkable continuous decline in CDS spreads. Although, at the end of the crisis period, 
the average CDS spread was still 157,59 basis points, over twice as high as at the end of 
2007, suggesting that the recovery had indeed started, but not quite finished. The 
remainder of the sample period suggests the same: On average, the CDS spreads have 
been increasing and the 100 basis points threshold have not been broken thus far.  
 
Obviously, the financial crisis of 2007–2009 hit the credit risk markets particularly 
hard, even for non-financial firms. The unraveling opacity in the CDS positions together 
with the transpiring of the crosswise and uncovered holdings ultimately lead to higher 
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systematic risk in CDS markets and, hence, caused the spreads to widen to the extreme. 
Furthermore, the credit risk markets have encountered smaller scale shocks as the 
effects of the European debt crisis in late 2009 and the U.S. government debt limit crisis 
in mid-2011 shook the markets, although not as severely as the initial financial crisis.  
 
As presented in Figure 6 below, the median CDS spread behaves in the same way and 
form as the mean CDS spread above. Though, the median spread seems to be 
significantly lower than the corresponding mean spread, suggesting that the mean is 
affected by some extreme (high) values. Certainly, there appears radical stretching in 
the median spread as well, starting from 45,48 basis points of fourth quarter of 2007 and 
finishing at 157 basis points at the end of 2008. However, as discussed above, the 
spreads of the upper 75 % quantile spikes significantly, reaching 340 basis points at 
year-end 2008, whereas the corresponding lower 25 % quantile tops at 105 basis points. 
This asymmetric behavior drags the mean spread to higher levels, while the median 
spread tends to stay on moderate levels. 
 
Figure 6. Median of CDS spreads with lower 25 % and upper 75 % quantiles in 
2007Q4–2012Q4 (in bps). 
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As discussed above, the credit risk asymmetry and the persistent uncertainty that had 
entered the economy and markets will widen the spreads in general, hence, causing 
broader deviation within the CDS spreads of the sample. In the same manner, as there 
are more investment-grade rated companies than speculative-grade rated companies, 
there are also quantitatively more companies in the lower side of average credit risk, 
according to the sample. Once the uncertainty and volatility enter the economy and 
credit risk markets, the lower rated companies react almost as explosive to the economic 
turbulence. The asymmetric risk distribution leads to extreme reactions in the upper tail, 
as discussed in the previous literature section. During lower volatility periods, that is, 
between crises, the asymmetry between higher quantile firms and median firms seems 
to settle and become more or less stationary.  
 
The fluctuated CDS spread, especially for riskier firms, can be as a consequence of 
many factors, such as initial credit risk increase of the underlying, speculative aspects of 
CDS, hence, leading into a short-squeeze situation (note that one advantage of choosing 
CDS over the bond is the viability and ease of stepping into a short position on credit 
risk), or squeeze as a consequence of (negative basis) arbitrage trading as discussed 
earlier. Also, the actualization of the systematic risk, particularly after the Lehman 
Brothers collapse widened the CDS spreads indisputably. 
 
 
6.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The 
summary statistics for raw interim variables together with CDS spread statistics are 
shown in Appendix 2. These numbers form the basis for further calculations of 
accounting-based financial ratios utilized in the analysis. The descriptive statistics for 
accounting ratios for the whole sample period of 2007–2012 are presented in Table 4. A 
quick comparison between descriptive statistics presented below and those of Das et al. 
(2009), suggests similarities in the size of total assets (TA) and median of interest 
coverage (COV). The mean and median CDS spread shows notable alteration with 
mean of 147,71 and median of 83,71 basis points being almost twice as high as from the 
mean 87,95 and median 48,50 reported by Das et al. (2009) between 2001–2005, 
respectively. The obvious reason for higher CDS spreads is the severe credit risk jump 
during the financial crisis of 2007–2009, as shown previously. 
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Also the liabilities to asset (TL/TA) and retained earnings to asset (RE/TA) ratios show 
differences between the two samples with mean (median) of 0,28 (0,27) and 0,31 (0,31) 
of this thesis, and 0,67 (0,67) and 0,18 (0,19) of Das et al. (2009), respectively. As can 
be noted from Table 4, some variables attain extreme or unreasonable values, such as 
maximum of interest coverage 7760,58 or minimum of total liabilities to common 
equity ratio (TL/CE) -3,47. These variables are unbalanced by nature and thus they can 
show extremely high (or low) for example, if the numerator varies around zero and 
attains extremely small positive or negative values.  
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for accounting-based ratios.  
 
 
Descriptive statistics for market-based variables are presented in Table 5. As can be 
seen from the table, the mean stock returns are slightly negative for the sample period as 
consequence of the radical stock price deteriorations during the financial crisis. On the 
other hand, the median quarterly stock return is notably higher, reaching 1,30 %. Again, 
compared to the statistics of Das et al. (2009), the only common market variable, 
annualized volatility, suggests more radical equity price movements for the sample 
period of this thesis than to the period of 2001–2005. Mean volatility 17,28 % is lower 
than 28 % of Das et al. (2009), but the maximum of volatility of the sample reaches 
high, up to 88,16 %.  Again, the aforementioned unbalanced nature of variable can be 
seen from the extreme values of earnings per share (EPS). 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for market-based variables. Equity return (RET) is 
expressed as quarterly return, volatility (VOL) is expressed as annualized volatility 
from daily returns of past quarter and leverage (LEV) as risky leverage based on market 
values of equity and risky assets. 
 
 
Interestingly, the risky leverage ratio provided with market information sets on average 
somewhat higher than the book leverage ratio total liabilities to total asset (TL/TA). The 
difference between the explanatory power and significance of the two leverage 
measures in terms of credit risk is truly one of the most interesting aspects of the 
following analysis. 
 
 
6.3. CDS spreads and accounting information 
 
The results of the relationship between selected accounting-based variables and CDS 
spread in 2007–2012 are presented in Table 6. The model follows Equation 9 presented 
earlier in the methodology section. Column 1 of Table 6 presents the estimation results 
without controlling for cross-sectional variation or time-series trend, whereas Column 2 
controls for cross-sectional fixed-effects and Column 3 for trend in the time series 
together with firm fixed-effects. 
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Table 6. Log of CDS regressed with accounting-based variables in 2007–2012.  
 
 
Unsurprisingly, all the estimation results in Column 1 are of expected sign. However, 
Columns 2 and 3 show contrary results for retained earnings to total asset (RE/TA), 
current ratio (CR) and total assets (TA), arguing against the hypothesis and expected 
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signs.  Similarly to previous results of Benkert (2004) and Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012), 
the explanatory power of the model measured by adjusted R-squared increases when the 
fixed-effects are employed. After employing cross-section fixed-effects, leverage 
measure (TL/TA) gains heavily economic significance together with liquidity ratio 
working capital to total asset (WC/TA). Additionally, profitability return on asset 
(ROA) remains statistically significant and economically almost equally important as 
leverage (ROA has not been scaled, therefore it needs to be multiplied by 100). 
 
Both the trend variables accounting for nonlinear time-series trend within the sample 
are statistically significant, suggesting lower general credit risk level in the quarters 
prior to 2008Q4 and marginal deterioration post-crisis. Working capital to total asset 
ratio (WC/TA) seems to gain importance and statistical significance, while other 
variables remain mainly the same as in Column 2, when controlling for time-series 
trend.  
 
Again, compared to the results of Das et al. (2009) and Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012), the 
results show differences in magnitude, which depends mostly on the selection and 
combination of modeled variables. However, the results find support from the results of 
previous studies regarding the significant accounting-based credit risk determinants.  
 
Table 7 reports the results of accounting-based credit model during the two sub-periods; 
the financial crisis of 2007Q4–2009Q2 in the first column and recovery period 
2009Q3–2012Q4 in the second column. Various observations regarding the credit 
dynamics can be made. First, the difference in the magnitude of return on asset (ROA) 
between -3,69 % in the crisis period and -0,38 % in the post-crisis suggest remarkable 
importance of fundamental profitability during economic uncertainty. Second, the 
impact of leverage (TL/TA) is almost twice as large in the crisis period than post-crisis, 
which again highlights the importance of leverage and fundamental cornerstones of firm 
health triangle. Interestingly, the size variable (TA) is positive and statistically 
significant for both sub-periods. Also, similar to results discussed above, retained 
earnings to total asset (RE/TA) remains highly significant and opposite to the expected 
sign during the crisis period. Finally, the effect of liquidity (WC/TA) seems to be 
important only in the latter, recovery sub-period. The magnitude of the variable (-
0,75 %) is also greater post-crisis than in the initial sample (-0,60 %) with higher 
statistical significance. The greater importance of the liquidity proxy during healthy 
economical regime could be explained by different allocation of interest, as the 
aforementioned profitability and leverage or solidity are more essential and, thus, under 
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strict surveillance, during high uncertainty, while liquidity can be seen as a more of a 
fine-tuning or performance measure of short-term liabilities and cash management. 
 
 
Table 7. Log of CDS spread regressed by accounting variables in two time periods.  
 
 
A comparison to the results of Tang and Yan (2012) and Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012) 
reveals similarities in the behavior of accounting-based variables between crisis and 
normal periods. Both of the studies support the finding that size of the firm becomes 
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more and more a burden, widening the CDS spread, during the crisis period. Contrary to 
their findings that size has a negative effect on CDS spread (prior to crisis), the findings 
in Table 7 find that even after the crisis, larger firms tend to have larger spreads. 
Furthermore, there are similar observations of the strengthening relationship between 
profitability (ROA) and CDS spreads between different economic regimes. 
Additionally, the increasing effect of leverage is reportedly similar than to those of 
previous studies.  
 
On the other hand, there are distinguishable findings regarding the effect of liquidity 
and WC/TA ratio. Both Tang and Yan (2012) and Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012) report 
increased importance of liquidity and cash ratio during crisis period. Indeed, current 
ratio (CR) does gain economic magnitude during the crisis period (0,0745) compared to 
post-crisis sub-period (0,0230), but it does not show statistical significance.  
 
 
6.4. Market-based variables 
 
The relationship between market-based structural variables and CDS spreads is 
presented in Table 8. As with earlier results, the full sample period results from fixed-
effects regression are presented in the first two columns and moreover, the results are 
divided into sub-samples in the latter two columns. Generally, the explanatory power of 
market-based model is higher than of the accounting-based model with adjusted R-
squared of 82,44 % and 73,95 %, respectively. This finding is supported by several 
previous studies, as discussed earlier. The Mertonian credit risk variables, that is, equity 
return and volatility, leverage and risk-free rate, are all statistically significant at 1 % 
significance level and hold the expected signs. A profitability ratio earnings per share 
(EPS) does not gain statistical nor economical significance during any of the sample 
periods. Correspondingly, a unique investor-profitability measure dividends per share 
(DPS) is not statistically significant in explaining CDS spreads. Interestingly, DPS ratio 
has both negative and positive signs depending on the prevailing sub-period, signaling 
mixed relationship between the ratio and credit risk. Certainly, during high uncertainty 
and economic turbulence, high DPS ratio does not improve firm’s ability to service its 
liabilities. This proposition is supported by the finding in the third column, as DPS 
variable has a positive sign. On the other hand, during economic boom, higher 
dividends can signal stability and wealth, thus narrowing CDS spread, which is 
precisely what the last column of Table 8 suggests.  
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Time-series trend variables suggest diminishing general credit risk after the folding 
point of 2008Q4. Only the marginal effects measuring nonlinear trend variable shows 
statistical significance, which infers decreasing CDS spreads and credit risk after the 
financial crisis. This is also supported by increased intercept term during the crisis 
period (4,90) compared to post-crisis period (4,05).  
 
The most dominant market-based variables are the volatility (VOL) and risky leverage 
(LEV) with vastly over 1 % effects on CDS spread, respectively. Additionally, the 
relationship between equity returns (RET) and CDS spread shows very robust evidence 
for Merton’s structural model, though with some variation between the crisis (-0,09 %) 
and post-crisis (-0,23 %) periods. Risk-free rate (RF) has a negative effect on CDS 
spreads as supposed according to previous findings on the relationship. Risk-free rate 
shows statistical significance in all sub-samples and again, its effects seem to strengthen 
during turbulent market conditions.  
 
 
Table 8. Log of CDS spread regressed by market-based variables in different regimes. 
Equity return (RET) is measured as quarterly return and volatility as annualized 
volatility from daily returns of quarter.  
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Again, the magnitudes of structural variables are in line with previous findings of Tang 
and Yan (2012), Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012) and Das et al. (2009), supporting the 
remarkable importance of volatility and leverage in credit risk dynamics. Moreover, the 
effect of equity return is found significant both economically and statistically, 
contributing to higher level of equity and, thus, narrower CDS spread. 
 
 
6.5. Comprehensive model 
 
As described earlier in the methodology section, the comprehensive model is formed on 
the basis of significant firm credit risk variables from both accounting-based and 
market-based models. Thus, the final model consists of return on asset (ROA), retained 
earnings to total asset (RE/TA), size of total assets (TA), equity return (RET), volatility 
(VOL), and market leverage (LEV). Risk-free rate was not included in the model as it is 
not strictly endogenous firm credit risk measure, even though it showed significance in 
the analysis above. Retained earnings to total asset (RE/TA) ratio was included in the 
model so that the possible changes in the sign could be observed. 
 
Between the two leverage ratios, book leverage (TL/TA) and market-based risky 
(LEV=total liabilities to risky assets), the latter was chosen to the comprehensive 
model. The choice was made based on the economic and statistical significance and the 
explanatory power between the variables. Although, the effects of both leverage 
measures are similar, the market-based “risky leverage” is also in favor of structural 
credit risk theory and since the sample firms are publicly traded, it is natural to use the 
available market-valued data rather than book values.  
 
The estimation results for comprehensive model for the whole sample period 2007–
2012 are presented in Table 9. Column 1 presents the estimation results without 
accounting for firm fixed-effects, while Columns 2 and 3 employ cross-sectional fixed-
effects estimation with time-series trend in Column 3. Obviously, as market data is 
added to the initial accounting-based analysis, the adjusted R-squared of regression 
jumps from 18,05 % to 30,85 % without employing fixed-effects. This implies that 
market information does carry a great load of firm specific credit risk information on 
the top of the accounting information. Furthermore, market information can capture 
magnitude and significance from initial accounting-based variables, as it is basically 
more filtered and refined form of interim financial data.  
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Such effect has occurred in the case of return on asset (ROA): While it was contributing 
significantly to the CDS spread according to accounting-based model, it shows neither 
high statistical nor economic significance in the comprehensive model when using 
fixed-effects approach. However, it holds the expected negative sign, while retained 
earnings to total asset (RE/TA) ratio changes signs again being statistically significant 
at the same time. Similar observations can be made for size of total assets (TA) variable 
between Columns 1 and 2. All in all, accounting-based variables seem to lose some 
statistical and economic significance, when market information is introduced, except for 
return on asset, which diminishes in a greater fashion.  
 
On the other hand, market-based variables (equity return, volatility and leverage) hold 
or even gain magnitude in the comprehensive model. Coefficient of equity return (RET) 
-0,3256 gains economic magnitude when nonlinear time series trend is added, compared 
to market-based model coefficient of -0,2078. Similar pattern can be observed for 
volatility (VOL) coefficient: when time series trend is accounted for, the effect of 
volatility increases from 1,6983 to 1,9965 in comprehensive model, whereas the effect 
decreases from 1,7212 to 1,1086 in market model, respectively. The effect of leverage 
shows robustness and changes fairly modestly between market model and 
comprehensive model and with time series adjustments.  
 
Time series trend shows statistical significance in Column 3. However, compared to 
Table 6 or Table 8, the first trend component seems to be somewhat greater (0,023) than 
of those previously presented. Furthermore, the second trend component, the marginal 
component, seems to be higher in value than of those earlier marginal components. The 
changes in the coefficients of selected credit risk variables and in their statistical 
significance suggests that there is an unobserved nonlinear element affecting the CDS 
spread, that is not captured by the (accounting) variables. Regardless, the market-based 
variables show exclusive robustness in contributing to firm CDS spread, whether 
accounting for time series trend or firm fixed-effects.  
 
Compared to the results of Das et al. (2009), there are similarities regarding the 
coefficient of volatility, whereas Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012) and Tang and Yan (2012) 
report opposite, diminishing findings on differences between comprehensive and 
market-based models. Analogously with Tang and Yan (2012), the coefficient of firm 
size (TA) changes signs when employing firm fixed-effects in comprehensive model. 
Furthermore, both Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012) and Das et al. (2009) find comparable 
results about the decreasing effect of accounting-based variables in comprehensive 
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model. In fact, none of the accounting-based risk determinants gain either economic 
magnitude or statistical significance (but rather the opposite), whereas market-based 
variables hold their significance in a remarkably robust manner.  
 
 
Table 9. Comprehensive credit risk model estimation results. The estimation covers 
time period from 2007Q4 to 2012Q4.  
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Next, the possible explanations for diverse performance of accounting-based credit risk 
determinants are taken under examination. The significance capturing effect of time 
series trend variables suggest that the relationship between firm’s CDS spread and 
accounting ratios is not linear. Thus, the asymmetric dynamics need to be explored. 
 
 
6.6. Credit risk asymmetry  
 
Next, the nonlinear effects of credit risk determinants on CDS spreads are examined 
with quantile regression approach. Compared to previous studies, for example Benkert 
(2004), Tang and Yan (2012), in which the effects of credit risk levels are based strictly 
on credit ratings, the quantile regression approach offers a unique and more unbiased 
view to credit risk asymmetry. First, asymmetries are examined in a general level to 
conclude whether there exists asymmetric effects between credit determinants and CDS 
spreads. Second, quantile regression estimation results are reported and analyzed. 
Again, the distinction between economic regimes, that is, crisis and post-crisis sub-
periods, is applied and the findings are analyzed. Finally, statistical tests are employed 
to decide whether the asymmetric effects between credit risk determinants and CDS 
spreads are statistically significant and notable. Note that in this section, the changes in 
CDS spreads are presented in basis points instead of relative changes. 
 
Graphs of relationships between credit risk quantile estimates and CDS spreads are 
presented in Figure 7. For the purposes of this thesis, the main point of interest is in the 
shape of the graphs: The more nonlinear the quantile estimate line (blue line), the more 
there occurs asymmetric effects. Convex shapes, such as constant (C), volatility (VOL) 
or leverage (LEV), imply that the effects of the credit risk determinant accelerates when 
moving to higher credit risk (CDS) levels in a spread widening manner. Concave 
shapes, such as total assets (TA), return on asset (ROA) or equity return (RET), imply 
also accelerating effects for higher credit risk levels, but in a contrary, negative 
(narrowing) fashion. S-shaped slope of retained earning to total assets (RETA) implies 
accelerating effects for both high and low tails of credit risk, and somewhat uniformly 
flat effects for around the median risky firms. 
 
As can be observed from Figure 7, most of the acceleration appears to be in the higher 
quantiles, say, after 70 % or 80 % quantile for almost every variable. Particularly high 
intensifications of slope can be found from higher quantiles of RET, ROA, RETA and 
LEV curves. Only RETA curve indicates lower quantile asymmetric effects, while the 
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rest of the curves maintain rather linear shape in the quantiles below the median. Thus, 
Figure 7 contributes to the presumption that there are asymmetric effects between CDS 
spreads, at least among the higher risk (spread) firms.  
 
Figure 7. Quantile estimates for comprehensive model variables with CDS spread in 
basis points. Results for 10-quantiles presented (blue line) in vertical axel in basis points 
with 95 % confidence level (red lines). 
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Furthermore, Appendix 3 presents the above-discussed observations in numerical form. 
The quantile process estimates show statistical significance for every quantile of every 
variable except return on asset (ROA). As shown in Figure 7, the shape of ROA line is 
rather flat for quantiles under 80 % until it suddenly drops at the highest risk tail. This 
finding is also confirmed by Appendix 3, which suggests that ROA appears to be 
significant only in the 90 % quantile.  
 
Results for symmetric quantiles test are presented in Table 10. Essentially, this 
asymmetry test examines whether the tail quantile estimations are different from the 
median estimation results, that is, whether the slope of the credit risk determinant is 
symmetric and linear. The results in Table 10 cover the whole sample period of 
2007Q4–2012Q4 and the results are provided in basis points. The given quantile limits 
are 10 % and 90 % in the first column (τ = 0.1), and 25 % and 75 % for the second 
column (τ = 0.25), respectively.  
 
In the second column of Table 10, the differences appear to be statistically significant 
only for the constant, total assets and leverage. This is vastly confirmed by Figure 7, 
which suggests that for these variables, there are greater differences within narrower 
credit risk quantiles. For these credit risk variables the effects are considerably broader 
in terms of quantile limits and credit risk asymmetry, suggesting that their general 
significance in contributing to firm’s CDS spread is rather recognized.  
 
On the other hand, when the quantile limits are widened to 10 % and 90 %, more 
variables gain statistical significance and, thus, support the asymmetric effects. Only 
return on asset (ROA) and retained earnings to total assets (RETA) present symmetric 
effects between the given quantiles, indicating that their effects on CDS spread are not 
different from median in the 10 % tails of the distribution. However, the results imply 
that there is asymmetric, nonlinear behavior between the 10 % tail quantiles for the rest 
of the credit risk determinants. Aside from constant, the primary asymmetries occur in 
the effects of leverage (239,04) and volatility (207,03).  
 
Spread-widening variables, such as leverage and volatility, have positive test values, 
which indicates increasing asymmetry (convexity) in the higher quantiles. For convex 
curves, positive symmetric quantiles test values indicate asymmetry, and on the 
contrary, for concave curves, negative test result indicates asymmetry between 
quantiles. Therefore, spread-narrowing variables, such as equity return or size of total 
assets, have negative test values, suggesting asymmetric dynamics (concavity). As can 
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be deduced from the symmetric quantiles test results between the two quantile limits 
presented in Table 10, the asymmetric effects transpire in the very tails, not so much 
around the median. 
 
 
Table 10. Symmetry test for effects of comprehensive model variables (CDS spread in 
basis points).  
 
 
Compared to the results of Benkert (2004) and Tang and Yan (2012), the relationship 
between the intercept and credit risk level (denoted in credit rating in their studies) is 
naturally positive: the riskier the firm, the higher the starting point of CDS spread. 
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However, when comparing the effects of leverage and volatility between credit risk 
levels or thresholds, there appears to be opposite observations. Tang and Yan (2012) 
report diminishing effects for volatility and leverage and increasing effect for equity 
return, when moving from investment grade to non-investment grade firms. The 
findings are opposite to the accelerating findings presented in Figure 7 and Appendix 3, 
and in Table 10. The differences can be explained with unequal information contents of 
credit ratings and CDS spread levels, as they are essentially two different approaches to 
firm’s credit risk.  
 
All in all, as graphically suggested by Figure 7 and, moreover, statistically confirmed by 
Table 10, the level of CDS spread predetermines the effect of credit risk determinant to 
the spread. Hence, there appears to be asymmetric effects on the different levels of CDS 
spread and furthermore, the magnified effects seem to concern principally higher spread 
(risk) firms. There seems to be very little asymmetry in the lower quantiles, that is, 
greater positive changes with lower CDS spread. The high quantile focus of asymmetric 
effects is very understandable since healthy firms do not require for extraordinary 
attention, whereas for higher risk firms, the risk needs to be accounted for in a faster 
and more precise manner.  
 
 
6.7. Regime dependency of credit risk determinants 
 
Next, the asymmetric effects are examined within the sub-periods in a same fashion, by 
employing quantile regression. Thus, the quantile regression results can be compared 
between sub-periods, deepening the analysis on financial crisis and credit risk 
dynamics. Table 11 presents the quantile regression estimation results for 10 % and 90 
% quantiles for the whole sample period and two sub-periods, as described earlier.  
 
There are several interesting observations can be made from Table 11. First, there occur 
extreme fluctuations in the explanatory power of the models, that is, in the adjusted R-
squared. For lower quantile (τ = 0.1) estimations, the adjusted R-squared values are 
3,90 % for the whole sample period, 8,93 % for financial crisis period and 2,84 % for 
recovery period. Unsurprisingly, the explanatory power is the highest during the 
financial crisis period as general credit risk increased and caused unstable movement in 
both CDS spreads and credit risk measures. After the crisis, the movement stabilized, 
probably causing more and more unexplained variation, and hence lower explanatory 
power for the modeled lower quantile.  
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Respectively, the explanatory power of the estimated models soars radically when the 
higher quantile (τ = 0.9) is considered, reaching 22,02 % for the whole sample period, 
31,05 % for financial crisis period and 17,87 % for post-crisis period. Yet again, the 
higher explanatory power of high quantile estimation compared to low quantile is most 
probably explained by asymmetric monitoring: Lower risk firms are less prone to 
sudden, default-leading operations, while for high risk firms, the launching stimulus can 
occur at any time, causing a vortex ending to default. Hence, monitoring and fine-tuning 
for smaller incentives can be viewed as more essential and necessary function for higher 
risk firms than for lower risk firms, that are principally rather far from default.  
 
 
Table 11. Quantile effects of comprehensive model variables between different regimes 
(CDS spread in basis points).  
 
 
As with adjusted R-squared, a similar pattern can be revealed in the estimation results of 
quantile regression model between time periods and quantiles. For lower quantile (τ = 
0.1) estimation results, there are a few variables, most notably volatility and leverage, 
that intensify remarkably during the crisis sub-period compared to post-crisis or whole 
sample period. Contrary, some variables, such as size of total assets and return on asset, 
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lose statistical significance during turbulent, high volatility regime. Of these two 
variables, return on asset does not show significance in any of the estimation periods, 
while size of total assets behaves as predicted during the post-crisis period. Equity 
return and retained earning to total assets ratio show robust results with minimal 
alterations between sub-periods and holding their predicted signs together with 
statistical significance.  
 
For high quantile (τ = 0.9), there appears to be more radical changes in the credit risk 
dynamics between estimation periods. First, for the whole sample period, every variable 
shows statistical significance with predicted signs. Also the magnitude of the effects is 
remarkable, for example, 709,02 basis points quarterly widening for one percentage 
increase in annualized volatility and elevation of 450,29 basis points for every one 
percentage point of (risky) leverage, respectively. On the other hand, the downsizing, 
narrowing effects show notable strength as well with -164,51 basis points for every one 
percentage point increase in return on asset, or -117,65 basis points for every percentage 
point of equity return gained in the quarter. All in all, compared to the lower quantile, 
the effects of credit risk determinants together with number of significant variables have 
increased and amplified imposingly. 
 
Again, there are radical changes among the credit risk determinants for higher quantile 
between crisis and post-crisis sub-periods. For example, the coefficient of return on 
asset reaches -389,94 during the financial crisis period being statistically significant, 
whereas during the post-crisis period, it changes signs and jumps to 107,99 without 
being statistically significant, respectively. Compared to the estimation result for the 
whole sample, the magnitude of return on asset over doubles from -164,51 to -389,94, 
suggesting the emphasized effects of essential profitability for high risk firms, 
especially during economically uncertain periods. Contrary to ROA, there appears 
opposite phenomena for the effects of equity return and volatility. Instead of decreasing 
effects during post-crisis period, these variables gain from increased economic certainty 
in terms of statistical and economic significance: The effects of volatility and equity 
return accelerate from 672,75 and -31,44 (no statistical significance) to 1079,13 and -
214,84, respectively, when moving past the financial crisis to recovery period. 
Interestingly, these market-based variables become extremely sensitive in explaining 
CDS spread during the healthy post-crisis period, when at the same time the overall 
explanatory power (adjusted R-squared) declines from 31,05 % to 17,87 %.  
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Apart from the aforementioned extreme fluctuations, the rest of the variables (RE/TA, 
TA, LEV) show robust results with very little alterations between the sub-periods. A 
quick glance at the standard deviations reveals that during the crisis period, the general 
deviation of the credit risk determinants was eccentric, even twice as much as in the 
post-crisis period among the highest quantile.  
 
The spread of risk determinants between the low and high quantiles maintains the 
corresponding form observed above between sub-periods. For robust variables (RE/TA, 
TA, LEV), the spread between quantiles holds rather evenly between the sub-periods 
compared to the initial sample period. Naturally, the spread in the intercept term 
increases during the crisis period and narrows post-crisis. However, as reported above, 
the spreads of RET and VOL squeeze exceptionally narrow during the financial crisis 
period, suggesting an increase in the systematic risk in the CDS markets. The 
actualization of the systematic risk narrows the essential credit risk determinants and 
since every firm is more or less in the same boat, their vulnerability and sensitivity to 
risk determinants converges. Once the pressure and the systematic risk has fallen to its 
normal stages, the spreads between low and high quantiles widen again, as can be seen 
from Table 11.  
 
Appendices 4 and 5 present results for symmetric quantiles test for the estimates of two 
sub-periods. In respect to the test results of initial sample period presented in Table 10, 
which showed statistically significant asymmetric effects (τ = 0.1) for the intercept, TA, 
RET, VOL and LEV variables, the asymmetric dynamics within the sub-periods can 
now be compared between each other and the initial sample period. Again, results are 
provided for both τ = 0.1 and τ = 0.25, the former in the first column and the latter in 
the second column, respectively.   
 
First, in Appendix 4, the symmetric quantiles test is employed for financial crisis sub-
period. A quick glance in the second column reveals that there is no statistically 
significant asymmetry between the 0.25–0.75 quantiles, suggesting that the risk 
dynamics converge and become more and more linear during the financial crisis. 
However, there appears to be a few statistically significant asymmetries in the first 
column between the 0.1–0.9 quantiles. As described above, the narrowing of the effects 
of given credit risk determinants carries on to the results of symmetric quantiles test: 
Even the tail effects of equity return and volatility become closer to linear and squeeze. 
Furthermore, positive test result for equity return suggests that the curve flattens and the 
tail effects converge. This is also supported by the narrowed spread of equity return 
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between quantiles presented earlier in Table 11. Similar observations can be made for 
volatility, which again shows no statistically significant asymmetric behavior during the 
crisis due to the narrowed spread between the quantiles.  
 
However, the aforementioned robust determinants total assets and leverage show 
statistically significant asymmetric dynamics during the financial crisis. As discussed 
earlier, these variables hold their spread somewhat evenly in different sub-periods, and 
thus they show asymmetric behavior during the crisis as well. Certainly, firm 
fundamentals are emphasized during volatile economic conditions, which adds to the 
robustness of the variables and furthermore, to the significance of the empirical credit 
risk induction rather than theoretical credit risk approach. The effect of firm size 
indicates elevated “conciliating halo”; larger firm size signals security and stability 
during volcanic conditions, which essentially leads to narrower CDS spread and 
emphasized asymmetric effects between tail quantiles. Additionally, the intercept 
variable, that is the “model starting point”, seems to capture the asymmetrically 
distributed credit risk effectively during the crisis, inferring increased systematic risk in 
the CDS markets. Because the comprehensive model shows increased linearity, i.e. 
lower asymmetry (also higher explanatory power) during the crisis period, there appears 
to be an unobserved determinant increasing general credit risk.  
 
Symmetric quantiles test results for post-crisis period are presented in Appendix 5. 
Compared to crisis period, statistically significant asymmetric effects occur even at 
0.25–0.75 quantile limits for firm size and leverage variables, both being very close to 
the test values of crisis period. Also the intercept term suggests increased asymmetry in 
0.25 quantile tails in the post-crisis period. When the quantiles are narrowed to 0.1–0-9 
limits, the asymmetric dynamics seem to intensify for most variables. Every credit risk 
determinant except return on asset shows statistically significant asymmetric effects 
between the tails and the median. Test values are considerably higher than in crisis 
period, suggesting increased asymmetric tail effects in post-crisis period. Overall, 
general asymmetry appears to rise among the credit risk determinants when the crisis 
has been bypassed. Contrary to the crisis period observations, that is, an increased 
asymmetry in intercept and decreased asymmetry in determinants, the findings suggest 
lower systematic risk and, naturally, higher sensitivity to firm-specific risk 
determinants.  
 
Ultimately, the transformation in risk asymmetry from market risk to firm-specific risk 
determinants is a consequence of actualization of downside systematic risk occurred in 
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2007–2009, which eventually lead in upswing in common risk factors. Although the 
asymmetry diminishes during the financial crisis, the estimation results from both 
ordinary least squares and (high) quantile regression suggest that the total variation 
explained by the models increases during the period. Moreover, the estimation results 
suggest unevenly distributed credit risk dynamics, whereas symmetric quantiles tests 
employed give somewhat mixed results for different sub-periods, validating asymmetric 
effects for most determinants during initial sample period and post-crisis sub-period. 
During the crisis period, asymmetric effects are confirmed only for leverage and firm 
size (total assets) as well as for intercept term, suggesting increase in general risk level 
rather than sensitivity to firm-specific credit risk preferences. This is also supported by 
squeeze between high and low quantiles in most otherwise significant credit risk 
variables. After the crisis unraveled, the nonlinear effects and firm-specific sensitivity 
returned to CDS spread dynamics, which is confirmed by symmetric quantiles test 
(Appendix 5) and quantified by quantile regression (Table 11). 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis set out with aims to examine the relationship between credit default swap 
spreads and different credit risk determinants in dynamic economic regimes by studying 
the effects of firm-specific variables on corresponding credit default swap spread with 
207 U.S. non-financial companies in 2007–2012. The linkage between credit risk 
determinants and CDS spreads is furthermore decomposed and nonlinear dynamics are 
studied between different credit risk levels. This asymmetric approach to credit risk and 
CDS spreads is unique and yet uncovered by previous literature on credit default swaps 
and credit risk models. Thus, the goal of this thesis is to look deeper into this 
fundamental relationship between credit risk and CDS spreads, i.e., “price of default 
insurance”. 
 
First, the relationship between firm-specific accounting- and market-based credit risk 
variables and CDS spreads are examined by conducting linear regression with CDS 
spreads and chosen risk determinants. The accounting-based empirical components 
provide some confirmation to the findings of earlier research and, respectively, to the 
first hypothesis, while market-based structural variables seem to control the credit risk 
assessment, as suggested by previous studies. The main findings are that during the 
financial crisis, the most essential and robust accounting variables, such as leverage 
(TL/TA) and profitability (ROA), intensify, referring to the increased sensitivity and 
emphasis on fundamentally important firm health factors. Similar observations can be 
made for effect of leverage from market model approach, although both equity return 
and volatility show diminishing effects during the financial crisis. Thus, null hypothesis 
regarding the relationship between economic regimes and credit risk determinants is 
rejected. Additionally, a comprehensive model consisting of both significant 
accounting-based empirical components and market-based structural components 
performs overall better than accounting-based model, which is again suggested by 
previous studies. Hence, the second hypothesis regarding improving effects of market-
based variables is supported. 
 
Second, asymmetric effects of credit risk determinants on different levels of credit risk 
are studied. Compared to earlier research, controlling for levels of CDS spread rather 
than credit rating is a unique property and provides robust results, unbiased from credit 
rating. To examine the asymmetric dynamics, a quantile regression is conducted with 
comprehensive model variables. Moreover, the variables are tested with symmetric 
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quantiles test in different sub-periods for statistical confirmation. The results are an 
achievement of the goals set out, providing evidence for hypothesis of asymmetric 
effects for higher and lower risk firms, that is, top and bottom 10 % quantiles. 
Furthermore, the nonlinear dynamics are examined in different economic regimes, 
suggesting decreased asymmetry during crisis period and correspondingly increased 
asymmetry during post-crisis sub-period. Although the asymmetry diminishes during 
the crisis period, the model provides robust results for the chosen variables and suggests 
significant effects particularly for high quantile (risk) firms for every sub-period. 
 
A distinction between robust credit risk determinants and volatile, unstable determinants 
can be made based on the spreads of the estimated coefficients in different sub-periods. 
Robust variables, such as retained earnings to total asset, size of total assets and 
leverage, perform very similarly in dynamic economic conditions maintaining their 
asymmetric effects (except retained earnings to total assets during the crisis). On the 
one hand, during economic uncertainty, higher risk firms tend to benefit relatively more 
from larger size (measured in total assets) than lower risk firms. On the other hand, the 
spread-widening effect of increased volatility is also significantly greater for the top 
10 % riskiest firms than for lower risk firms, respectively.  
 
In the post-crisis period, the asymmetric effects spread to broader range of risk 
determinants, considering every comprehensive model variable except return on asset. 
Once the general uncertainty had faded away from CDS markets and recovery had 
begun, the firm-specific asymmetric effects accelerated. The (firm-specific) credit risk 
asymmetry seems to develop inversely to systematic market risk, highlighting general 
uncertainty and effects of essentially important risk determinants (such as leverage) 
during volatile conditions. In lower volatility conditions and lower systematic risk, the 
individual differences are emphasized and the performance discrete sensitivity 
increases.  
 
The results suggest that the most remarkable credit risk determinant is leverage, whether 
it is measured by using book or market values. This finding is naturally inducted from 
the very nature of default: once the level of liabilities exceeds the level of assets the 
firm is in default. Unsurprisingly, the pronounced significance of leverage is empirically 
supported and stated regarding both cases of actual bankruptcies and CDS spreads, and 
empirical build up and theoretical structural models.  Furthermore, profitability displays 
great significance in credit risk assessment, which again highlights the importance of 
impact of essentially vital cornerstones of healthy company.  
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Interestingly, the size coefficient (size of total assets) has a signaling effect on firm’s 
credit risk and CDS spread. There are mixed empirical results regarding the effect of 
firm size: Das et al. (2009) report only negative relationship between firm size and CDS 
spread, while Trujillo-Ponce et al. (2012) and Tang and Yan (2012) report spread-
narrowing effects for pre-crisis period and oppositely spread-widening effects for crisis 
period. Furthermore, Tang and Yan (2012) find similarly, that when fixed-effects are 
employed size has a positive linkage to CDS spread, whereas the effect is negative 
(narrowing) without fixed-effects. On the other hand, size coefficient appears to be 
negative (or very close to zero) in every sub-period when quantile regression is 
employed. For riskier firms, the sense of stability and security brought by larger firm 
size is evident. Perhaps the underlying presumption is that larger firms (even the riskier 
ones) are safer because of heavier monitoring, increased amount of information and 
publicity, or better reputation and prestige.  
 
In turn, market-based structural variables show great explanatory strength, as described 
earlier. Arguably, some of the information content contributed by equity market 
variables leads to diminishing effects in accounting-based variables. The double 
information causes usually the initial variable to lose significance, as equity market 
information is based on the firms’ financial data, such as financial statements, analytics’ 
predictions or firms’ press releases and inside information. Furthermore, the underlying 
data is filtered and processed into equity market information that can be utilized in 
structural credit risk assessment. On the other hand, equity market information contains 
also a lot of information nonrelated to credit risk of the firm, which causes greater 
deviations of the estimation values as seen in the spreads of volatility and equity return 
between high and low quantiles.  
 
All in all, the results provide evidence on both the importance of accounting-based 
variables and also market-based variables. It can be concluded that there should be a 
golden path in the middle of these two approaches, as also suggested by earlier studies. 
Moreover, the effects of credit risk determinants can be concluded as nonlinear in 
respect to prevailing economic regime. Asymmetric effects among credit risk 
determinants are observed in different levels of CDS spread. These asymmetries narrow 
during turbulent economic conditions, whereas they appear significantly strong in post-
crisis period. As a conclusion, there can be observed an intensifying survival 
phenomenon in CDS markets and asymmetric credit risk dynamics. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1. List of firms included in the sample. 
 
COMPANY	   TICKER	  
AmerisourceBergen	  Corp.	   ABC	  
Abbott	  Laboratories	   ABT	  
Affiliated	  Computer	  Services	   ACS	  
Archer	  Daniels	  Midland	   ADM	  
Automatic	  Data	  Processing	  Inc.	   ADP	  
Ameren	  Corporation	   AEE	  
American	  Electric	  Power	   AEP	  
AES	  Corporation	   AES	  
Aetna	  Inc.	   AET	  
Allergan	  Inc.	   AGN	  
AK	  Steel	  Holding	  Corp.	   AKS	  
Advanced	  Micro	  Devices	   AMD	  
American	  Tower	  Corporation	   AMT	  
Apache	  Corp.	   APA	  
Anadarko	  Petroleum	  Corporation	   APC	  
Air	  Products	  &	  Chemicals	   APD	  
Ashland	  Inc.	   ASH	  
Allegheny	  Technologies	  Inc	   ATI	  
Avon	  Products	   AVP	  
Avery	  Dennison	  Corp.	   AVY	  
AutoZone	  Inc.	   AZO	  
Baxter	  International	  Inc.	   BAX	  
Best	  Buy	  Co.	  Inc.	   BBY	  
Black	  &	  Decker	  Corp.	   BDK	  
Becton	  Dickinson	   BDX	  
Baker	  Hughes	   BHI	  
BJ	  Services	  Company	   BJS	  
Ball	  Corp.	   BLL	  
Bemis	  Company	   BMS	  
Bristol-­‐Myers	  Squibb	   BMY	  
Burlington	  Northern	  Santa	  Fe	  
Corp.	   BNI	  
Boston	  Scientific	   BSX	  
Peabody	  Energy	   BTU	  
ConAgra	  Foods	  Inc.	   CAG	  
Cardinal	  Health	  Inc.	   CAH	  
Cameron	  International	  Corp.	   CAM	  
Caterpillar	  Inc.	   CAT	  
CBS	  Corp.	   CBS	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  Enterprises	   CCE	  
Constellation	  Energy	  Group	   CEG	  
Chesapeake	  Energy	   CHK	  
Clorox	  Co.	   CLX	  
CMS	  Energy	   CMS	  
CenterPoint	  Energy	   CNP	  
Campbell	  Soup	   CPB	  
Computer	  Sciences	  Corp.	   CSC	  
CSX	  Corp.	   CSX	  
CenturyTel	  Inc	   CTL	  
Centex	  Corp.	   CTX	  
CVS	  Caremark	  Corp.	   CVS	  
Chevron	  Corp.	   CVX	  
Quest	  Diagnostics	   DGX	  
D.	  R.	  Horton	   DHI	  
Danaher	  Corp.	   DHR	  
Walt	  Disney	  Co.	   DIS	  
Dover	  Corp.	   DOV	  
Dow	  Chemical	   DOW	  
Dr	  Pepper	  Snapple	  Group	   DPS	  
Darden	  Restaurants	   DRI	  
DTE	  Energy	  Co.	   DTE	  
DIRECTV	  Group	  Inc.	   DTV	  
Duke	  Energy	   DUK	  
DaVita	  Inc.	   DVA	  
Devon	  Energy	  Corp.	   DVN	  
Equifax	  Inc.	   EFX	  
Edison	  Int’l	   EIX	  
EMC	  Corp.	   EMC	  
Eastman	  Chemical	   EMN	  
Emerson	  Electric	   EMR	  
EOG	  Resources	   EOG	  
Eaton	  Corp.	   ETN	  
Entergy	  Corp.	   ETR	  
Exelon	  Corp.	   EXC	  
Freeport-­‐McMoran	  Cp	  &	  Gld	   FCX	  
FedEx	  Corporation	   FDX	  
Fidelity	  National	  Information	  
Services	   FIS	  
Fluor	  Corp.	   FLR	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Flowserve	  Corporation	   FLS	  
Gannett	  Co.	   GCI	  
General	  Mills	   GIS	  
Corning	  Inc.	   GLW	  
Gap	  (The)	   GPS	  
Halliburton	  Co.	   HAL	  
Hasbro	  Inc.	   HAS	  
Hess	  Corporation	   HES	  
Honeywell	  Int’l	  Inc.	   HON	  
Starwood	  Hotels	  &	  Resorts	   HOT	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	   HPQ	  
Block	  H&R	   HRB	  
Harris	  Corporation	   HRS	  
Hospira	  Inc.	   HSP	  
The	  Hershey	  Company	   HSY	  
Humana	  Inc.	   HUM	  
International	  Bus.	  Machines	   IBM	  
International	  Game	  Technology	   IGT	  
Interpublic	  Group	   IPG	  
Iron	  Mountain	  Incorporated	   IRM	  
ITT	  Corporation	   ITT	  
Illinois	  Tool	  Works	   ITW	  
Jabil	  Circuit	   JBL	  
Johnson	  Controls	   JCI	  
Penney	  (J.C.)	   JCP	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   JNJ	  
KB	  Home	   KBH	  
Kraft	  Foods	  Inc-­‐A	   KFT	  
Kimberly-­‐Clark	   KMB	  
Kohl’s	  Corp.	   KSS	  
Leggett	  &	  Platt	   LEG	  
Lennar	  Corp.	   LEN	  
L-­‐3	  Communications	  Holdings	   LLL	  
Lilly	  (Eli)	  &	  Co.	   LLY	  
Lockheed	  Martin	  Corp.	   LMT	  
Lowe’s	  Cos.	   LOW	  
LSI	  Corporation	   LSI	  
Southwest	  Airlines	   LUV	  
Lexmark	  Int’l	  Inc	   LXK	  
Masco	  Corp.	   MAS	  
Mattel	  Inc.	   MAT	  
McDonald’s	  Corp.	   MCD	  
McKesson	  Corp.	   MCK	  
Medtronic	  Inc.	   MDT	  
Massey	  Energy	  Company	   MEE	  
Medco	  Health	  Solutions	  Inc.	   MHS	  
3M	  Company	   MMM	  
Merck	  &	  Co.	   MRK	  
Marathon	  Oil	  Corp.	   MRO	  
Murphy	  Oil	   MUR	  
MeadWestvaco	  Corporation	   MWV	  
Mylan	  Inc.	   MYL	  
Noble	  Energy	  Inc	   NBL	  
Nabors	  Industries	  Ltd.	   NBR	  
Newmont	  Mining	  Corp.	  (Hldg.	  
Co.)	   NEM	  
NIKE	  Inc.	   NKE	  
Northrop	  Grumman	  Corp.	   NOC	  
National	  Oilwell	  Varco	  Inc.	   NOV	  
Norfolk	  Southern	  Corp.	   NSC	  
Nucor	  Corp.	   NUE	  
Newell	  Rubbermaid	  Co.	   NWL	  
New	  York	  Times	  Cl.	  A	   NYT	  
Office	  Depot	   ODP	  
Omnicom	  Group	   OMC	  
Occidental	  Petroleum	   OXY	  
Pepsi	  Bottling	  Group	   PBG	  
Pitney-­‐Bowes	   PBI	  
PG&E	  Corp.	   PCG	  
PepsiCo	  Inc.	   PEP	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   PFE	  
Progress	  Energy	  Inc.	   PGN	  
Pulte	  Homes	  Inc.	   PHM	  
PerkinElmer	   PKI	  
Pepco	  Holdings	  Inc.	   POM	  
PPG	  Industries	   PPG	  
PPL	  Corp.	   PPL	  
Pactiv	  Corp.	   PTV	  
Pioneer	  Natural	  Resources	   PXD	  
Reynolds	  American	  Inc.	   RAI	  
Rockwell	  Automation	  Inc.	   ROK	  
Range	  Resources	  Corp.	   RRC	  
Donnelley	  (R.R.)	  &	  Sons	   RRD	  
Republic	  Services	  Inc	   RSG	  
RadioShack	  Corp	   RSH	  
Raytheon	  Co.	   RTN	  
SCANA	  Corp	   SCG	  
Sealed	  Air	  Corp.(New)	   SEE	  
Schering-­‐Plough	   SGP	  
Sherwin-­‐Williams	   SHW	  
Smith	  International	   SII	  
Snap-­‐On	  Inc.	   SNA	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Sempra	  Energy	   SRE	  
Constellation	  Brands	   STZ	  
Supervalu	  Inc.	   SVU	  
Stanley	  Works	   SWK	  
Safeway	  Inc.	   SWY	  
Sysco	  Corp.	   SYY	  
Molson	  Coors	  Brewing	  Company	   TAP	  
Integrys	  Energy	  Group	  Inc.	   TEG	  
Target	  Corp.	   TGT	  
Tenet	  Healthcare	  Corp.	   THC	  
TJX	  Companies	  Inc.	   TJX	  
Thermo	  Fisher	  Scientific	   TMO	  
Tyson	  Foods	   TSN	  
Tesoro	  Petroleum	  Co.	   TSO	  
AT&T	  Inc.	   TTT	  
Time	  Warner	  Inc.	   TWX	  
Texas	  Instruments	   TXN	  
Textron	  Inc.	   TXT	  
United	  Health	  Group	  Inc.	   UNH	  
Union	  Pacific	   UNP	  
United	  Parcel	  Service	   UPS	  
United	  Technologies	   UTX	  
V.F.	  Corp.	   VFC	  
Valero	  Energy	   VLO	  
Vulcan	  Materials	   VMC	  
Walgreen	  Co.	   WAG	  
Wisconsin	  Energy	  Corporation	   WEC	  
Whirlpool	  Corp.	   WHR	  
Windstream	  Corporation	   WIN	  
WellPoint	  Inc.	   WLP	  
Williams	  Cos.	   WMB	  
Wal-­‐Mart	  Stores	   WMT	  
Wyeth	   WYE	  
Wyndham	  Worldwide	   WYN	  
Exxon	  Mobil	  Corp.	   XOM	  
Xerox	  Corp.	   XRX	  
XTO	  Energy	  Inc.	   XTO	  
Yum!	  Brands	  Inc	   YUM	  
Zimmer	  Holdings	   ZMH	  
	  	   	  	  
N	   207	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Appendix 3. Quantile process estimates of CDS spread in basis points.  
 
QUANTILE	  PROCESS	  ESTIMATES	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   Quantile	  	   Coefficient	   Std.	  Error	   t-­‐Statistic	   Prob.	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
CONSTANT	   0.100	   82,7280***	   15,9992	   5,1708	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.200	   113,4170***	   15,7958	   7,1802	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.300	   146,7334***	   17,5169	   8,3767	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.400	   189,3366***	   20,2811	   9,3356	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.500	   218,1173***	   20,8594	   10,4565	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.600	   260,8318***	   26,6900	   9,7726	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.700	   344,3375***	   29,0039	   11,8721	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.800	   459,4207***	   43,5059	   10,5600	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.900	   619,5992***	   60,7460	   10,1998	   0,0000	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
ROA	   0.100	   -­‐21,7648	   15,8829	   -­‐1,3703	   0,1707	  
	  	   0.200	   -­‐21,3091	   17,3842	   -­‐1,2258	   0,2204	  
	  	   0.300	   -­‐34,2995	   21,0482	   -­‐1,6296	   0,1033	  
	  	   0.400	   -­‐22,2650	   22,9079	   -­‐0,9719	   0,3311	  
	  	   0.500	   -­‐45,9238	   28,9059	   -­‐1,5887	   0,1122	  
	  	   0.600	   -­‐34,6128	   30,8271	   -­‐1,1228	   0,2616	  
	  	   0.700	   -­‐40,3587	   36,2187	   -­‐1,1143	   0,2652	  
	  	   0.800	   -­‐57,0946	   49,3504	   -­‐1,1569	   0,2474	  
	  	   0.900	   	  	  -­‐164,5122**	  	  	   75,0375	   -­‐2,1924	   0,0284	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
RE/TA	   0.100	   	  -­‐7,8482***	   2,7006	   -­‐2,9061	   0,0037	  
	  	   0.200	   	  -­‐13,2053***	   2,3828	   -­‐5,5419	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.300	   	  -­‐14,1223***	   2,5975	   -­‐5,4368	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.400	   	  -­‐15,8196***	   2,9483	   -­‐5,3657	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.500	   	  -­‐17,0157***	   3,1897	   -­‐5,3345	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.600	   	  -­‐16,2920***	   4,3908	   -­‐3,7105	   0,0002	  
	  	   0.700	   	  -­‐18,0514***	   5,2927	   -­‐3,4106	   0,0007	  
	  	   0.800	   	  -­‐22,8730***	   6,9078	   -­‐3,3112	   0,0009	  
	  	   0.900	   	  -­‐31,6359***	   8,4022	   -­‐3,7652	   0,0002	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
LOG(TA)	   0.100	   	  -­‐3,4130***	   0,8766	   -­‐3,8934	   0,0001	  
	  	   0.200	   	  -­‐5,0301***	   0,8660	   -­‐5,8083	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.300	   	  -­‐7,1307***	   0,9920	   -­‐7,1882	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.400	   	  -­‐10,1194***	   1,1398	   -­‐8,8779	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.500	   	  -­‐12,4489***	   1,1796	   -­‐10,5537	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.600	   	  -­‐16,0152***	   1,5284	   -­‐10,4787	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.700	   	  -­‐21,6446***	   1,6456	   -­‐13,1531	   0,0000	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   0.800	   	  -­‐29,1022***	   2,3105	   -­‐12,5956	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.900	   	  -­‐38,3456***	   3,2784	   -­‐11,6965	   0,0000	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
RET	   0.100	   	  -­‐13,1747**	   5,4476	   -­‐2,4185	   0,0156	  
	  	   0.200	   	  -­‐18,5085***	   5,4243	   -­‐3,4122	   0,0007	  
	  	   0.300	   	  -­‐22,8620***	   7,5081	   -­‐3,0450	   0,0023	  
	  	   0.400	   -­‐34,1105***	   8,6684	   -­‐3,9351	   0,0001	  
	  	   0.500	   	  -­‐37,5895***	   10,0073	   -­‐3,7562	   0,0002	  
	  	   0.600	   	  -­‐36,5626***	   12,5571	   -­‐2,9117	   0,0036	  
	  	   0.700	   	  -­‐58,9551***	   10,5681	   -­‐5,5786	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.800	   	  -­‐62,3299**	   24,5585	   -­‐2,5380	   0,0112	  
	  	   0.900	  
-­‐
117,6523***	   27,2713	   -­‐4,3141	   0,0000	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
VOL	   0.100	   88,4650***	   15,1648	   5,8336	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.200	   142,1309***	   11,7725	   12,0731	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.300	   185,8915***	   16,2689	   11,4262	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.400	   223,8664***	   20,4512	   10,9464	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.500	   295,2287***	   24,3914	   12,1038	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.600	   361,0671***	   26,3149	   13,7210	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.700	   412,7501***	   21,6355	   19,0774	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.800	   528,6114***	   36,7148	   14,3978	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.900	   709,023***	   60,9194	   11,6387	   0,0000	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
LEV	   0.100	   19,1979***	   5,0010	   3,8388	   0,0001	  
	  	   0.200	   21,7685***	   5,6111	   3,8796	   0,0001	  
	  	   0.300	   38,2383***	   7,7010	   4,9654	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.400	   72,6919***	   9,9462	   7,3085	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.500	   115,2240***	   11,2227	   10,2671	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.600	   173,1543***	   13,5878	   12,7434	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.700	   243,3662***	   14,2745	   17,0490	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.800	   315,3784***	   22,1751	   14,2222	   0,0000	  
	  	   0.900	   450,2872***	   43,4069	   10,3736	   0,0000	  
Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***–significant at the 1 % level, **–significant at 
the 5 % level, *–significant at the 10 % level. 
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Appendix 4. Symmetry test for effects of comprehensive model variables in 2007Q4–
2009Q2 (CDS spread in basis points).  
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Appendix 5. Symmetry test for effects of comprehensive model variables in 2009Q3–
2012Q4 (CDS spread in basis points).  
 
 
 
